

COMPREHENSIVE DEFENCE AND STRATEGIC CULTURE FROM A HUMAN PERSPECTIVE

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The problem framework of this paper indicates that in the period of globalization of international relations, there have been changes in the reflection and practice of the state defensive function as a military activity. An indicator of these changes is recognized in the development and implementation of the strategic concept of comprehensive defence, which deviates from the traditional logic of the defensive function as the logic of military power. Considering the mentioned problem, the subject of the research is focused on the questions why and how the logic of the defensive function has changed and how these changes affect the strategic concept of defence and the state strategic culture. The paper starts from the thesis that the human civilizational development has conditioned a change in the values that state defends, as well as the character of the phenomena that threaten those values, which has resulted in changes in the logic of the defensive function, its strategic concept and the state strategic culture. In proving this thesis, the analogy of the defensive functions of man and state is used. Namely, the paper considers how the complex nature of man, as a biological and conscious being, shapes his defensive mechanism, and by finding out what the subject of human defence is and how man defends such a subject, it is possible, by analogy, to draw conclusions on the same issues of the state defensive function.

The paper concludes that the state defensive function, until recently, was based on those values and defensive behaviour of man that was characteristic of his natural state, i.e. on survival and aggressive

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behaviour. However, in recent decades, the civilizational development of man and society has changed the priorities in the values that state defends, as well as the character of the phenomena that threaten those values. As a result, the state defensive behaviour has changed. Namely, in modern global relations, in addition to survival, the quality of life is imposed as another vital value and the state defensive interest. On the other hand, in strategic relations between states, non-military phenomena of endangering their defence interests are gaining in importance. In response to these changes, the strategic concept of defence is based on comprehensive defence, i.e. on the logic of integrating military power with other elements of national power. Thus, the state strategic culture, which has so far been narrowly understood as a “military culture” or “the culture of the use of force”, is gradually changing.

Key words: *human nature, human defensive mechanism, state defensive function, strategic concept of defence, comprehensive defence, strategic culture*

Introduction

The essential question of every state is how to adequately preserve, develop, shape, strengthen and particularly protect its values. This is a problem of the strategic reflection in the field of national security as an intellectual and rational state activity aimed at finding optimal solutions for achieving and preserving national interests. In carrying out the state protective role, the defensive function plays a key role because it protects survival, territory and other vital values from external armed threats. However, an understanding of the defensive function, as a military state activity, is today subject to great reconsideration. There are many reasons for this, starting with the most significant one: that in the period of modern global relations, the consideration and practice of this function has gone beyond the traditional framework of considering war and has covered, to a great extent, other problems of security reality of a non-military character. Nowadays, this is indicated by the development and implementation of the strategic concept of comprehensive defence, which deviates from the traditional understanding of the state defensive function and is based on its modified logic. Therefore, some ambiguities arise, such as what the defensive function of a modern nation state is and why its previous logic is changing. Furthermore, it is unclear whether and how changing its logic, as the logic of military power, alters the strategic concept of defence and the state strategic culture. In considering these ambiguities, one should certainly start from the fact that state is a complex human creation, whose functions are subject to changes in accordance with the development of man and human society. Therefore, man, that is, his nature, is the starting point for commencing the search for deeper and meaningful answers to the above-mentioned questions.

The analogy of the defensive functions of man and state

According to social contract theory, "man, as a conscious and rational being, moves from his natural to a social state in order to resolve the essential problems of his existence, primarily security. Regardless of different views of proponents of this theory, regarding the understanding of whether man is good by nature, as argued by Locke, Rousseau and Kant, or evil and selfish as, on the other hand, was argued by Hobbes, their theoretical results converge to the opinion that individuals, in a non-social state, as free and equal among themselves, are joined together in a political community based on mutual agreement and agreeing to abide by common rules in order to protect themselves and others from violence and other injustices."¹ In other words, on the basis of the same values, man willingly associates with other people and establishes a political community in order to improve and, above all, protect those values. In such an effort, man "hands over power over himself to a political community, which establishes it as the supreme authority over the people who make up that community. This establishes a social order that limits the 'absolute freedom' of man and restrains his violent behaviour, which, according to Hobbes, is characteristic of relations between people in their natural state"².

The reason for the establishment of a political community from the aspect of security, however, does not only refer to the protection from mutual violence of those people who make up that community. In addition to the fact that man seeks to resolve his antagonistic relations with other people within his existential environment, he also strives to protect himself from the violence of people from other environments. And those are, in terms of human security, two key moments in the establishment of a political community. With its establishment, man has established a security mechanism, which has helped him to "restrain" his and other people's violent behaviour within his existential environment, but he has failed to establish supreme authority over political communities in order to resolve antagonistic relations with people from other environments. Thus, in the absence of supreme authority, each of these communities was forced to establish its security mechanism, in order to protect itself from the violence of other community. This mechanism, from the time of the establishment of a political community until today, is understood as the "state defensive function".

As the character of the international order has remained unchanged, it could be concluded that states are still in the situation in which man was before association, that is, in his natural state, as a state of anarchy, selfish interests, fear, mutual

¹ According to: Milorad Stupar, *Filozofija politike: Antičko i moderno shvatanje političke zajednice*, Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, IP Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 2010, pp. 245-, 255-257, 279-281; Milenko Bodin, *Teorijski osnovi menadžmenta nacionalne bezbednosti*, doktorska disertacija, Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2007, pp. 30-31.

² See more in: Stanislav Stojanović, *Hobsova teorija ljudske prirode i perspektive mira i poretka*, Medija centar "Odbrana", Beograd, 2012, pp. 87-124.

distrust and violence.³ Therefore, despite all positive achievements of human civilization, this, still unchanged, character of the international order encourages many theorists, especially those from the realpolitik school of international relations, to hold the view that defence is still the main state function, while its other functions are only derived or added. Other theorists, however, are not so categorical in their views, emphasizing only the importance of the defensive function. Thus, Slobodan Jovanović states that “the state defensive role is important because the cause of its establishment is the need for defence against external threats, from external attacks by other people organized for robbery and enslavement”.⁴

The human need for security is undoubtedly an important, if not the key, reason for man’s association. “The first common good of people was the sense of security that comes from community. Such a psychological feeling of greater protection when people are united and when someone who knows the way leads them are the foundations of the first political community. Therefore, the words *polis* in ancient Greek and *urbs* in Latin in their original meaning have the meaning of fence, rampart, enclosure. This rampart symbolises the joint effort that creates the common good”⁵, especially the one in the form of a sense of security. Since the state defensive function dates back to the first moments when man realised the idea of association, in order to more easily meet his need for security, it can be said that the history of this function is as long as the history of state itself. Thus, throughout history, defence has been and remains an inseparable state attribute. As such, it represents its oldest function, which, unlike other functions, has not experienced substantial changes until recently. The changes that have occurred within it in recent decades are a part of deep and complex changes that state itself is going through in its development process during the current period of globalization of international relations.

As a complex social phenomenon, prone to development and changes, state has developed throughout history simultaneously with the development of human society, i.e. man himself. Thus, in considering its defensive function, one should start from the fact that state is, above all, a human creation. It can be conditionally viewed as a social organism in which values, needs, instincts, motives, wishes, interests and certainly patterns of human reflection and behaviour are deeply woven. Thus, the state essence is found in man, mainly in his value system and the needs that arise from such a system, especially those values and needs that are related to his security. The transition of man from natural to social state and the “insertion” of his nature into the very essence of community explains the fact that the state existence is based on human needs. Thus, the state behaviour is based on the characteristics of human behaviour, which finds its source in man’s desire to meet his needs, including those for security. Therefore, security is not only a human, but also an

³ Thomas Hobbes describes the natural state of man as one in which everyone is a wolf to everyone. See in: Radoslav Stojanović, *Sila i moć u međunarodnim odnosima*, Radnička štampa, Beograd, 1982, p. 90.

⁴ Slobodan Jovanović, *Država*, BIGZ, Beograd, 1990, pp. 30-39.

⁵ Dragan Simeunović, *Uvod u teoriju politike*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2009, p. 44.

existential need of state itself, which, like man, establishes and develops its defensive mechanism in order to protect itself from threats to its existence. This points to the fact that the state need for security and its defensive behaviour in order to meet such a need cannot be explained in detail without an analogy with the same need and human behaviour.

In drawing this analogy, however, one should be careful because state, due to its complexity, cannot be explained in a simplified manner through a human perspective, primarily because for the most part it represents a "multitude" of different values, needs, motives and interests of people contained in "one". Namely, each person is a "world unto themselves", which is a consequence of complex human nature that establishes different value bases in each individual and thus encourages different motives, wishes, needs, as well as behaviour itself in meeting those needs. Such a diversity causes the internal state dynamics, so it cannot be understood as the compact and indivisible "one", as a simple and in time unchanging sum of values and interests of the people who make it up. Regardless of the mentioned, state, as an entity in itself, has its permanent and unchanging values on which it rests, such as survival, territory and sovereign power, as well as interests in preserving, improving or protecting these values. Nevertheless, most of its values and interests are the result of its internal dynamics, i.e. matching, compromise or even conflicting interests of people within it. Therefore, state is a complex social system including not only the internal dynamics, but also the dynamics of the structure of the external environment in which it exists in interaction with other international actors. That is why it can mostly be understood as the result of those two dynamics that apparently function independently of each other, but, nevertheless, largely overlap and exert a mutual influence. It is precisely such complexity of state that makes it difficult to view it in a simplified manner through a human perspective and to draw their analogy, certainly also in the domain that concerns the issues of security.

However, regardless of all existing difficulties, the analogy of the defensive functions of man and state can still be drawn using those common values of people and interests based on them, which strongly and relatively permanently occupy the state being and conditionally make it "the one", such as man himself. Viewed through the lens of a modern nation state, these values make *difiniens* of the term "national values" as a value category of state, while the interests based on them make *difiniens* of the term "national interests" as its political category. The difference between these categories is based on the fact that values of a nation are not firmly related to the "political" framework because they exist out of them. These are those common inherited values such as religion, language, history, ethnos, customs, beliefs, etc. that people gather around and "gain awareness of closeness and belonging to the same national identity".⁶ Those

⁶ Saša V. Mijalković, *Nacionalna bezbednost*, Drugo, izmenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje, Kriminalističko-policijska akademija, Beograd, 2011, p. 116.

values form the basis of national culture, which is recognized in political culture of a nation, but it is much broader than that. Having in mind their importance, every nation strives, that is, shows an interest in preserving, promoting and protecting these values. Most of these interests, however, cannot be achieved without state institutions as a political creation. That is why national interests, although considerably broader, are most often identified with state interests, and as such are considered a political category, that is, a category that is related to the institutional or political state actions.

The way in which state achieves national interests also falls under the framework of "political", but this category is more closely defined as strategic. It includes goals that state sets in an effort to accomplish national interests, as well as its behaviour that those goals are achieved by. In other words, by goals state sets tasks, whose execution helps it to achieve its interests, that is, to preserve, improve or protect the values on which it is founded and which it seeks. Thus, goals represent the operationalization of the achievement of interests, that is, the development of optimal manners of their accomplishment. That is why they are considered a strategic category because they are rationally developed in order to avoid arbitrariness and uncertainty of their achievement or so that, in such a process, there would be no greater harm than good for national interests. Thus, the state behaviour for the purpose of achieving those goals is also included within the framework of strategic category.

Through the relation of the mentioned categories, the role of a modern nation state can be understood, which it conducts through its functions, that is, institutional actions in its internal and external existential environment. Thus, the value, political and strategic category can be recognized in the starting points and outcomes of all state functions, including the defence one. The result of the state functions undoubtedly represents the state strategic behaviour, while their starting point is in the value category. Values are the source of all human needs and at the same time the needs of nation and state itself. Just like the human value system forms the essential basis of man's existence, so national values define the essence of its existence. They also define the essence of the state existence because they shape its being, giving it the meaning of existence and functioning. Viewed in this way, it can be concluded that national value system represents the existential basis of a nation state.

Due to the fundamental importance of the value category for the existence of a nation state, like man, it shows an interest not only in preserving and promoting the values which it rests on and strives to, but also in protecting them. Thus, the protective function of a nation state is shown to be an important, if not a crucial aspect of its institutional role. State protects national values from all forms of threats, regardless of their nature and origin. The special attention of this function is the protection of vital national values. Starting from the fact that such human values are those that meet man's basic need for survival, the conclusion is drawn by analogy that the vital values of state, i.e. nation, are those without which it could not survive

or, on the other hand, could not develop, which in the long run again leads to the question of its survival.

In addition to other values, the vital national values represent the subject of the state protection, and in a narrower sense, its subject of defence. This is important to understand having in mind that the state defensive function is often identified with its protective function, being, after all, only a part of it, but the existentially important one. In terms of contents, the protective function is much broader than the defensive function and, in addition to it, incorporates many other functions by which state protects national values, including those that are considered vital for its existence. "State, with its protective function, counters all forms of external and internal threats to national values, using different means and methods"⁷. On the other hand, the defensive function is directed primarily to external forms of violent threat to state, and exclusively threats to its vital values, i.e. those that its survival depends on. This indicates that the state defensive interests, as a part of the overall national interests, represent nothing else than its aspiration to protect vital national values from violent, armed threats, primarily from other states. In order to protect, or rather defend, these values, state defines strategic defence goals, whose accomplishment reduces or completely eliminates effects of such threats. State, like man, achieves the mentioned goals by means of a defensive mechanism, that is, by defensive behaviour in its existential environment - the international system.

The consideration of the relationship between the value, political and strategic category is not only useful in explaining the process of carrying out the institutional role of a nation state. Through this relationship, the culture of a nation can be understood as a permanent and relatively unchanging characteristic of its being. "Culture is the broadest term that includes all ideational factors that have an impact on human behaviour such as values, norms, attitudes, identity, etc. It is the overall social heritage, i.e. the learned pattern of feelings, thoughts and actions, whether of an individual, society or the entire nation".⁸ Thus, national culture is understood as an inherited and relatively permanent pattern of feelings, thoughts, wishes, and actions of a nation. It is recognized in the values that state is based on, then in the expression of its needs, as well as in the way state reflects and behaves in order to meet those needs.

An important part of national culture is strategic culture. As an analytical concept in strategic studies, it deals with the existentially important state issue, i.e. its defence. Although today the state strategy includes its overall reflection and behaviour, i.e. in all spheres of social life, and not only in the field of military activities, strategic culture is still understood within narrow realpolitik frameworks as

⁷ Ljubomir Stajić, *Osnovi bezbednosti - sa osnovama istraživanja bezbednosnih pojava*, Šesto izdanje, IK Draganić, Beograd, 2006, p. 14.

⁸ Jiyul Kim, *Cultural Dimension of Strategy and Policy*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College Press, May 2009, p. 6.

“the military culture or state culture related to the issue of the use of armed force”.⁹ For decades, this concept has considered the question of how national culture influences the establishment of its relatively permanent pattern of reflection and ways of using armed force. Therefore, strategic culture, although equally directed to periods of peace and war, is often identified with the “cultural understanding of war”.¹⁰

The previous considerations indicate a certain coincidence of the defensive functions of man and state. Namely, both state and man perform their defensive function through the categories of values, interests and protective actions, which in the case of man is explained by rational behaviour, and in the case of state by strategic behaviour. That is why, despite the existing limitations of the simplified understanding of state through a human perspective, sufficient room is left for the analogy of their defensive functions, even at the level of the most general understanding of the legality that equally rules within them. The expediency of drawing this analogy starts from the fact that by understanding the legality of the human defensive mechanism, relatively reliable conclusions can be drawn about the state defensive function and at the same time get to know reasons for the change in its logic and strategic concept. On the other hand, the validity of this analogy rests on the fact that human nature is deeply instilled in the defence reflection and behaviour of state, and the legality of the defensive functions of man and state is recognized as almost the same. In other words, human nature shapes the reflection and behaviour of man in meeting his need for security, while, on the other hand, as a conscious and social being, man reflects and shapes the state behaviour in meeting the very same need.

The legality of the defensive functions of man and state is noticed using analytical model, whose starting point is based on the fact that “defence is in a dialectical relationship with attack”¹¹. Namely, there is no defence without an attack, and it cannot be understood without a simultaneous understanding of an attack, as well, that is, what threatens the subject of defence. Since such a dialectical relationship is something that is constant, that does not change over time, the legality of the defensive functions of man and state is also an unchanging category. It is based on three logically related questions. The first is – what it is that man and state defend, that is, what are the values and needs that are the subject of their defence, and the second is – what man and state are defending against, more precisely, what and how threatens their subject of defence. By getting the answers to

⁹ Jeffery S. Lantis and Darryl Howlett, „Strategic Culture”, in: John Baylis, James Wirtz and Colin S. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary World: An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, Fourth Edition, Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 77-82.

¹⁰ Rashed Uz Zaman, „Strategic Culture: A Cultural Understanding of War”, *Comparative Strategy*, 28:1, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2009, pp. 68-88.

¹¹ Grupa autora, *Vojna enciklopedija*, Drugo izdanje, Knjiga 6, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1973, p. 251.

these two questions, i.e. by learning what the subject of defence is and what are the phenomena of its endangerment, it is possible to logically draw a conclusion, i.e. to get an answer to the last, third question - how man and state defend themselves, that is, in what way they respond to threatening phenomena in their existential environment.

Human nature as the basis of the state defensive function

In the search for an answer to the first question of analytical model - what man and state defend, that is, which values and needs their defensive mechanism is based on, one should start from the fact that the behaviour of man is conditioned by his nature. Namely, the complex and dual nature of man, as a biological and conscious being, shapes his reflection and behaviour in the environment in which he exists, in all its dimensions, including the security one within which man expresses the need for defence and practices it as his function. Having in mind the complexity of his nature, "human behaviour is determined by a complex system of needs",¹² which differs him from other beings because he expresses needs that go beyond his desire for survival. Plato's and Aristotle's view of human nature needs rests on this position. Plato states that "in addition to basic needs, such as food, each of us also seeks the satisfaction of more complex needs, for example education and culture"¹³. Similar to him, Aristotle states that "man, like everything that lives, thinks about preserving himself, he thinks about himself, but every man wonders how he should live. Human life would like 'good', he seeks his fulfillment in 'happy life'".¹⁴ Thus, Aristotle's "happy life" can serve as a framework concept, whose meaning includes the overall human needs, therefore, not only the instinctive or animal ones, but also other, higher needs that man uses to fully express himself both as a biological and a conscious being, striving for safe but, at the same time, high-quality lifestyle.

In a broad spectrum of human needs, the innate, instinctive need for survival is the fundamental and most powerful motivator of human behaviour. It is considered the fulcrum of the human defensive mechanism, and Maslow's theory of personality can be used to draw such a conclusion, which is based on the pyramidal model of the hierarchy of human needs, where the most basic physiological needs for food, air, water, reproduction, etc. are at the bottom of the pyramid, while above them there are higher human needs. The key to understanding the origins of the human defensive mechanism is contained in the main assumption of this model that higher

¹² Miomir Despotović, *Igra potreba: Andragoške varijacije*, Filozofski fakultet, Institut za pedagogiju i andragogiju, Beograd, 2000, p. 11.

¹³ Milorad Stupar, *Filozofija politike: Antičko i moderno shvatanje političke zajednice*, gen. quote, pp. 94-97.

¹⁴ Dragan Simeunović, *Teorija politike, Rider, I deo*, Udruženje "Nauka i društvo", Beograd, 2002, p. 22.

needs from this hierarchy appear in humans only after all lower level needs have been met, mostly or completely.

The lowest, that is, the most basic needs are the physiological human needs, which are directly related to his survival. It is the first thing that motivates and drives human behaviour. Thus, these are the "vital needs" of man, whose satisfaction conditions his life, as a biological being, and satisfaction of all his other higher level needs would not be possible without it. "Therefore, they are the most powerful driver of human behavior".¹⁵ "Only when they are met in human consciousness other needs appear that are weaker than physiological ones, but which at a given moment become dominant in relation to them"¹⁶, such as the need for security, belonging, respect and, last and highest "needs for self-actualization that Maslow also calls 'target needs', recognizing them in human search for justice, beauty, goodness, order, unity, etc."¹⁷

In his model, Maslow further points out that, after physiological, the following needs in order of importance, or necessity of satisfaction, are precisely those that offer a conclusion that the human defensive mechanism rests on them. These are the needs by which man expresses his desire for security, that is, for safety, protection, order, predictability of future situations, etc. They are quite broad in their spectrum, but for the most part, they are closely related to physiological needs because they express the effort of man to maintain or reach such a state within his existential environment that allows him to meet his needs for food, water, reproduction, habitat, etc. unhindered, thus his "vital needs". Furthermore, these needs reflect man's desire to protect himself from immediate violence that threatens his life. That is why the need for safety is "particularly emphasized when man is exposed to dangers, whether they are of natural origin, such as natural disasters, or of social origin, such as war".¹⁸

According to Maslow, the need for security is also related to other aspirations of man: to protect his personal property, job, steady income, etc., but it is important to note that these needs are a result of the civilizational development of man as a social being, which he achieves in community with other people, that is, within social community, i.e. state. Nowadays, such needs are more related to life quality than physical survival itself. They have been created by human socialization and are not innate to man in the form of instincts, but have been acquired under the strong influence of the social environment. Although many needs for security undoubtedly arise by human socialization, it is still important to emphasize that a part of them, more specifically those related to his survival, are deeply instilled into him. In the

¹⁵ Dragan Pajević, Ljubomir Kasagić, *Vojna psihologija*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 2001, pp. 214-215.

¹⁶ Želimir Puljić, „Samoostvarene osobe u psihologiji A. H. Maslowa“, *Crkva u svijetu*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Katolički bogoslovni fakultet, Split, 1980, pp. 270-271.

¹⁷ Kelvin S. Hol, Gardner Lindzi, *Teorije ličnosti*, Nolit, Beograd, 1983, p. 261.

¹⁸ Dragan Pajević, Ljubomir Kasagić, *Vojna psihologija*, gen. quote, pp. 214-215.

foundations of man's need for security, i.e. in his natural state, like every animal, there is the drive for life, for survival, which Freud considers, in addition to the death drive, to be the strongest human drive. It is a strong innate need of man that is at the foundation of his existence as an animal, which, as such, has been transferred to his existence as a social being. That is why the need for survival is the key reason for the association of people and the establishment of an original, and later also a political community, as a kind of security mechanism that man uses to meet this need.

The aforementioned considerations indicate that the part of human nature that makes man a biological, that is, an animal being, defines the starting point, that is, the value basis of his defensive mechanism. Therefore, the human defensive mechanism is based on life as its main value, that is, on the instinctive need for survival, which is also the basis of the defensive mechanism of other beings. Consequently, life is undoubtedly the subject of defence of the human defensive mechanism. Such a subject also includes all those goods that have vital importance or value for human survival, such as food, water, air, habitat, etc.

Thus, from the aspect of the second question of analytical model: what man defends against, it can be concluded that the human defensive mechanism, like the animal one, is directed towards all those phenomena of violent nature that threaten his survival. Therefore, these are all those destructive phenomena, of social and natural origin, which threaten the unhindered satisfaction of human physiological needs, and man's life would not even be possible without their satisfaction, as well as those phenomena which directly threaten his life. "In the beginning, there were only phenomena of natural origin, natural disasters and the animal world, but over time, the greatest danger to man has become another man".¹⁹

Since human nature is "inserted" into the very essence of state and thus it functions on the principle of meeting human needs, sufficient room is left to draw a conclusion about the value foundation of the state defensive function based on the human defensive mechanism. Namely, analogous to man, the need for survival is at the very foundation of the state defensive function. State, as a kind of a living organism, like man, behaves in accordance with Hobbes' point of view that "everything that exists in nature tends to be maintained, to last, to be the highest that naturally can be".²⁰

However, before considering this issue, it is necessary to view Aristotle's understanding of the state essence. According to him, "the state goal is not only the preservation of life, but also good life. State is established for the purpose of sustaining life, and it exists for the sake of 'happy life'".²¹ "Human happiness is the

¹⁹ Saša V. Mijalković, *Nacionalna bezbednost*, gen. quote, p. 40.

²⁰ See more in: Stanislav Stojanović, *Hobsova teorija ljudske prirode i perspektive mira i poretka*, gen. quote, p. 58.

²¹ Milorad Stupar, *Filozofija politike: Antičko i moderno shvatanje političke zajednice*, gen. quote, p. 20, 162.

goal to be strived for and for whose sake a community is established. It is achieved by activities in the field of statesmanship and warfare".²² In other words, not only man's happiness represents his aspiration for survival, but also for life quality. Thus, the state role in meeting human needs has to be viewed in a much broader framework in relation to its protective function. Namely, with warfare activities in achieving happiness, Aristotle describes the state aspiration for its survival, and also for the survival of man himself because by protecting itself, state also protects man. On the other hand, Aristotle relates state activities to ethical issues because in antiquity, politics, that is, state, was viewed as "a place where justice, virtue and fairness are exercised, i.e. the highest human good".²³

Considering Aristotle's understanding of the state essence through the lens of a modern nation state, it could be concluded that its role is not only to protect its survival and, at the same time, the survival of nation. It also aims at achieving the high-quality life of nation. Therefore, the state functioning is not determined only by the need of man for survival, but by a complex system of his needs. That is why state expresses a wide range of different needs immanent to man, such as those for security, belonging, respect and self-actualization.²⁴ Nevertheless, survival dominates other state needs because, as Mearsheimer states, "if state is enslaved, it is unlikely that it will be in a position to pursue its other goals".²⁵ Therefore, state has to exist to meet its other needs, which coincides with Maslow's theory that man can meet higher needs only when he meets the most basic ones related to his

²² See more in: Vojislav Stanovčić, *Politička teorija*, Tom I, JP Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2008, pp. 249-251.

²³ Ilija Vujačić, *Politička teorija: Studije, portreti, rasprave*, Fakultet političkih nauka, Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2002, p. 13.

²⁴ The state need for belonging is recognized in its aspiration for identity classification, ethnic, religious, ideological or, in the broadest sense, civilizational one. Civilization is the highest cultural grouping and the broadest level of cultural identity of states, as pointed out by Samuel Huntington in his thesis on the "clash of civilizations". State also strives for self-actualization, i.e. complete execution in accordance with its being, as well as the need for respect of other states. This is recognized, for example, in Francis Fukuyama's thesis on the "end of history", which he uses to triumphantly declare the victory of liberal ideology over the collectivist ideologies of socialism, political Islam and others. He emphasizes the post-Cold War moment of "complete realization" of the Western states, which cherish the political philosophy of liberalism in their essence. In this way, liberal states become superior in relation to other and position as superior in value (See more in: Semjuel Hantington, *Sukob civilizacija i preoblikovanje svetskog poretka*, Drugo izdanje, CID, Podgorica, Romanov, Banja Luka, 2000; Frensis Fukujama, *Kraj istorije i poslednji čovek*, CID, Podgorica, 2002). Liberal philosophy, by the way, is the stronghold of the US "excellence", the sense of the value superiority of the United States. The idea that its values are the best and universally acceptable inevitably demands unconditional respect of other countries. However, the need for respect does not only arise from a sense of superiority. It is equally immanent to small, in terms of the quantum of power, inferior states that strive to preserve their identity, independence and equal relationship with more powerful states, especially great powers.

²⁵ Džon Miršajmer, *Tragedija politike velikih sila*, Izmenjeno i dopunjeno izdanje, Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2017, p. 64.

survival. That is why vital values for the state survival are the focus of its defensive function, which it uses to try to protect them from violent forms of threats. They are recognized in the constitutive state elements, population, sovereign power and particularly territory because without one of these elements state would not even exist. That is why Mearsheimer considers “the state survival through its aspiration to maintain territorial integrity and autonomy of its internal order”.²⁶ Thus, it can be conditionally stated that state itself, like man, expresses physiological needs for those values that its survival depends on.²⁷

Regarding the explanation of the subject of defence and phenomena that threaten it, state is, nevertheless, much more complex than man because it exists in two environments - internal and external. Its internal environment, as it has been said, is shaped by a “multitude” of different values and interests of the people who make it up, and they are often in a state of conflict. On the other hand, the external existential state environment is permeated, as stated by Dušan Višnjić, “by its strategic relations with other states, and at the poles of those relations there are interests dominated by a conflict, even with friendly states and allies”.²⁸ A state of conflict between governments within both existential state environments can be noticed, and they undoubtedly represent the source of threats to its survival. Nevertheless, they differ greatly in that the social order rules in the internal environment with the role of institutional restraint of people’s violent behaviour and the development of their conflicts into phenomena that threaten the state survival. In the external existential environment, however, there is no such order, so the state defensive function is primarily focused on external phenomena threatening its survival, and these are mostly recognized in the aggressive behaviour of other states.

The consideration of different environments in which state exists is also important from the aspect of understanding the previously mentioned values that it defends. The history of the state development, from slave ownership, through feudal, then absolute and parliamentary monarchy, to modern republic, has shown that values such as justice, freedom, equality, morals, etc., have the dominant importance in its

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ The physiological need of state, for example, is recognized in its need for territory, which is identified with human need for habitat. As habitat provides man with the availability of food, water, etc., territory provides state with resources and population necessary for its development and survival. Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen point out that “territory is an organic part of the state entity that it draws power from and cannot be separated from it, otherwise it will disappear”. Namely, “soil is a fundamental, unchangeable fact that people’s interests revolve around, thus their struggle for living space is reduced to a typical struggle for survival” (Milomir Stepić, *Geopolitika: Ideje, teorije, koncepcije*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2016, pp. 143-148, 155-181; Aleksandar Dugin, *Osnovi geopolitike: Geopolitička budućnost Rusije*, Ekopres, Zrenjanin, 2004, pp. 39-43).

²⁸ Dušan Višnjić, *Strategija države kao sudbina nacije*, Ministarstvo odbrane, Institut ratne veštine, Beograd, 2005, p. 25.

internal existential environment. These values reflect the constant striving of man to improve the quality of his life in community with other people in conditions of social inequalities. Throughout the history of the state development, man has managed to reach these values to the extent that depended on the type of government and economic organization of the state in which he lived. However, he has never managed to do it completely, even today when the aforementioned values are strongly developed and incorporated in the very essence of the existence of a modern nation state. Therefore, man's pursuit of these values has remained present, strongly shaping the internal state dynamics. On the other hand, man has largely managed to solve the issue of his survival within a political community, so this value does not have a primary role in the internal existential state environment. However, that value, as the state value, appears as existentially important in the anarchic structure of its external existential environment. While the values of justice, freedom, equality and others are mainly related to society and man himself, power and survival are values that are related more to state as an actor of international relations. Therefore, power and survival, as well as other vital values closely related to the state survival, such as territorial integrity, are presented as dominant in its external environment.²⁹

In considering the third question of analytical model: how man and state defend themselves, one should start from the fact that man is a being of fear and a being that strives for power because these are two important sources of his aggressiveness, as the dominant form of his defensive behaviour. Namely, the previous considerations indicate that the human defensive mechanism is aimed at a wider range of threatening phenomena of natural or social origin, but it is usually considered within the framework of antagonistic relations between people, that is, through the aggressive behaviour of a person towards the other person. Such a form of relationship and behaviour is characteristic of state itself, which, analogous to man, can also be considered as a being of fear that aspires to power.

²⁹ Although the values of the internal and external environment are undoubtedly related, shaping the overall state dynamics, they can nevertheless be considered independently of each other, out of the framework of mutual influences. Namely, the civilizational development has changed the value basis of states, sometimes completely, and sometimes to a lesser or greater extent. Thus, certain types of states have disappeared from historical scene, such as slave ownership and feudal states, or have become the subject of great changes such as monarchy, while other types of states such as civil republic have emerged. With such changes, state "has lost, changed or gained new functions. The only function that has survived and remained unchanged, regardless of the type of the state social organization is defence, as its external function" (See more in: Mila Č. Jegeš, "Osnovne funkcije savremene države", *Kultura polisa*, No. 24, year XI, 2014, pp. 409-424). The above-mentioned indicates that the values of survival and power are historical state constants, and that they were not subject to the influence of changes in the internal value state system. Namely, regardless of the type of internal organization, wars have always been waged between states through power relations, and the state survival was a possible option for war results. Thus, from the aspect of the defensive function, the internal and external value basis of state can be viewed as relatively separate entities.

Fear is an innate human emotion. It has a physiological basis, but also its external expression because it arouses a reaction, that is, human behaviour, which is often of an aggressive character. Namely, "the fear of suffering and death forces man to obey the stronger, and also to fight with equal or weaker than himself".³⁰ In some situations, the feeling of fear is so emphasized that man is ready or rather forced to defend himself against someone much stronger than him, especially in those situations when his life is in danger, and he cannot avoid it. This is also indicated by Erich Fromm, who states "that living beings resort to aggression if they have no possibility of escape".³¹ The fear of death, on the other hand, can also be viewed as a reason why a person attacks the other person. Like an animal, man attacks in situations when his drive to meet certain physiological needs is so emphasized that, out of fear for his survival, he is forced to endanger the life of the other person in order to meet these needs.

Certainly, such human behaviour is a picture of ancient times and above all a reflection of his natural state. However, it is important to understand that the emotion of fear and aggressive behaviour are deeply instilled into man, they are closely related and present in situations when he defends himself and when he attacks. Thus, Fromm believes that "aggression is innate and is manifested in all living beings that are faced with the survival of the species or danger per an individual. It is an instinctive reaction to the situation of external threats to vital interests".³² Considering that it is instinctive, as well, Friedrich Nietzsche attributes the "inevitability of wars"³³ to human aggressiveness, which was pointed out much earlier by Hobbes, who relates aggressiveness to the drive for power. According to him, "the drive for power dominates human nature and is a constant cause of mutual endangerment of people and the conduct of wars".³⁴

In a state of threat, the emotion of fear causes discomfort in man, which grows into his need for security, that is, a state in which he feels not threatened. "In order for man to reach a state of security, he needs power, as great as possible, his or someone else's".³⁵ It is understood as "the ability to achieve the desired outcomes and if necessary to change the behaviour of others in order to accomplish it".³⁶ Understood, in the most general sense, as the ability to achieve what is desired, power is a key tool, an instrument in reaching a goal, and the most important goal of

³⁰ Dragan Simeunović, *Uvod u teoriju politike*, Institut za političke studije, Beograd, 2009, p. 43.

³¹ Saduša F. Redžić, "Ličnost, temperament i karakter u teoriji Eriha Froma", in: Branko Jovanović (ed.), *Zbornik radova Filozofskog fakulteta XLII (2)/2012*, Filozofski fakultet, Priština, 2012, pp. 395-396.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ranko Popović, *Uvod u vojnu psihologiju*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1975, p. 83.

³⁴ See more in: Stanislav Stojanović, gen. quote, p. 8.

³⁵ Dragan Simeunović, *Uvod u teoriju politike*, gen. quote, p. 43.

³⁶ Džozef S. Naj, *Paradoks američke moći: Zašto jedina svetska supersila ne može sama*, BMG, Beograd, 2004, p. 24.

man is his life, that is, survival. Thus, like every living being, he strives for more power as a guarantee of preserving his life. Due to the insufficiency of one's own power, such an aspiration is achieved by acquiring or increasing power through association with other people. Thus, the essence of human association rests on man's aspiration for power, which is necessary in order to reduce or completely eliminate the cause of his fear of death and suffering. For Hobbes, "the drive for power is man's deepest nature and his most essential definition".³⁷

Analogous to man, state is also a being of fear that, for the same reasons, strives to increase its power, and in such an aspiration it often behaves aggressively in relations with other states. Such an understanding of state is recognized in the theories of defensive and offensive neorealism by Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. Analyzing relations of the great powers, Mearsheimer states that they are afraid of each other. They look at each other with suspicion and worry about a possible conflict. The level of fear among them varies through space and time, but never ceases.³⁸ Unlike the classical realism of Hans Morgenthau, who views power as the state goal in itself because the human drive for power is instilled into its being, neorealists emphasize the instrumental character of power, which is necessary to achieve the state security and survival. They indicate that the anarchic structure of the international order is the key source of the state fear and the initiator of its constant reflection on survival and increasing its power.

Thus, fear and power are two important initiators of the aggressive behaviour of man and state, which is recognized in their defensive behaviour. However, the source of aggressiveness is interpreted differently in humans. Some consider it an acquired motive due to the socialization of a person in a certain environment, which cannot be completely rejected. However, many authors consider it instinctive behaviour. Having in mind the prevailing opinions, which indicate that aggression, like fear, is something that is innate to man, that he inherits as a biological being, the question arises whether the human defensive behaviour is also instinctive or, after all, something more than how it could differ from the defensive behaviour of other beings? Although not directly aimed at considering the human defensive behaviour, Freud's psychoanalytic theory can help in getting an answer to this question. Being behaviorist in its approach, it explains why man thinks the way he thinks and why he behaves the way he does.

According to Freud, human mind is "torn between three masters" – the *id*, *ego* and *super-ego* are psychological constructs in human mind between which the entire human psychological functioning takes place. How a person thinks and behaves depends on them and their mutual interaction. Freud "sees the animal, primal and instinctive in man in the *id*".³⁹ It includes the unconscious part of a personality in

³⁷ See more in: Stanislav Stojanović, gen. quote, p. 58.

³⁸ Džon Miršajmer, *Tragedija politike velikih sila*, gen. quote, p. 64.

³⁹ Nemanja Kurlagić, „Id, ego i superego”,

<http://www.otkrovenje.com/index.php/teme-meni/ostalo-meni/26-id-ego-i-superego>, 26/03/2020.

which all biological “programmes” are contained, i.e. everything that is innate to man - drives, instincts, fears, thus also aggression as an instinctive human reaction. The *id* is not subject to the laws of logic and functions solely on the principle of pleasure, disregarding limitations and moral norms. Its only goal is to meet the most basic needs important for human survival. Within the *id* there are unconscious ideas charged with powerful instinctive energy that Freud calls *libido*. They constantly try to reach the consciousness and prevail the behaviour of man in order to satisfy his needs as soon as possible.

According to Freud’s theory, if *libido* were completely untamed, man would not differ from an animal. He would satisfy physiological needs in the way animals do, regardless of the ethical constraints of the social environment. Thus, in order to satisfy the need for security, more precisely survival, man would uncontrollably manifest his aggressiveness by defending himself or attacking other people in pursuit of food, water, habitat, etc. Thus, he would instinctively behave like an animal by unconditionally fulfilling the demands of the *id*, following the untamed libidinous force. The reason why man does not behave in this way is that the *ego*, as a conscious and rational part of a personality, with the assistance of the *super-ego*, as a part of a personality in which moral norms are stored, controls and directs *libido*, i.e. transforms its raw and “blind” energy into a socially acceptable one. Therefore, human behaviour in satisfying the instinctive need for survival is rather different compared to animal behaviour, first of all, because it is based on conscious and not exclusively instinctive behaviour. Although man has the drive to protect himself in situations when he is threatened, his consciousness, as *differentia specifica* in relation to other beings, shapes his instinctive and aggressive defensive behaviour, and such behavior is deeply incorporated into the defensive behaviour of state itself.

Human consciousness, however, does not only serve the socially acceptable containment and channeling of raw libidinous energy, which is what Freud is talking about. The instinctive aggressive behaviour of man, as well as the same behaviour of state, is also channeled in the direction of rational defensive behaviour, which is in the case of state also called strategic. Strategy, namely, represents an idea how to accomplish the set goals in an optimal way. It is based on interests and directed to goals. Understood in this way, it is recognized in the daily behaviour of man, as a conscious and thinking being, who, according to his wishes or interests, rationally thinks about how to achieve his goals, even those related to his survival. However, the concept of strategy is usually related to state. The state strategy “is understood through the interaction of its goals, ways and means. Through its concept, it describes the way in which available means, instruments of state power are used to achieve the goals of its policy”,⁴⁰ and its most important political goal is survival. In considering the state strategic behaviour, it is important to understand that at the

⁴⁰ Mackubin Thomas Owens, „Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 60, No. 4, Art. 10, 2007, p. 111.

centre of its strategic reflection is man. Following the same principles as he thinks of his defensive behaviour, man, as a mental and rational being, develops and shapes the state defensive behaviour. That is why man is the starting point for considering the question - why the current logic and strategic concept of the state defensive function is changing.

The change of the logic of the state defensive function - comprehensive defence and strategic culture

The way in which state confronts phenomena threatening its survival is explained by the logic of the defensive function and the strategic concept of defence, more precisely by strategy. Logic is recognized in the very "heart" of strategy, i.e. in its concept. It is based on causality, which indicates that the concept of endangering the subject of defence influences the choice of the defence concept. Its choice would have to be adequate in relation to the concept of endangerment, first of all, in terms of its effectiveness. If the concept of endangerment is by its character aggressive in its manifestation to the subject of defence, the logic of the defensive function dictates the choice, by nature, of the same defence concept. In this way, the desired effects can first be achieved, i.e. reduction or complete elimination of effects of a threatening phenomenon on the subject of defence.

Of course, there are different choices of countering methods, but aggression is usually responded to with aggressive behaviour, especially if opposing parties are approximately equal in power, whether they are people or states. As stated, considering an instinctive reaction of living beings to the feeling of violent threat, Fromm states "that these beings resort to aggression if they have no possibility of escape".⁴¹ With certain differences in relation to living beings, and man himself, this countering logic can be recognized in the state defensive behaviour. It is logically assumed that state will respond to the aggressive behaviour of the other state with the same behaviour in order to protect itself, even in conditions of pronounced asymmetry of power. It does not have the possibility of escape like a human or an animal, so if it is attacked it has to respond with aggressive behaviour because otherwise it will be enslaved or it will disappear.

The logic of the defensive function is thus related to the issue of power, that is, strategic relations of power. It considers what kind of power there is at the ends of the state strategic relations. If there is military power at an end used by a state to threaten or endanger the other one, then it can be expected that at the other end of such a relationship, there will also be military power as a means of reliable deterrence and opposition to the other state. At that end, other types of power can

⁴¹ Saduša F. Redžić, "Ličnost, temperament i karakter u teoriji Eriha Froma", gen. quote, pp. 395-396.

be found, such as diplomatic, economic or information, but the greatest reliability in opposing military power is provided by the possession of the very same power because it can most effectively influence the will and behaviour of the opposite party. Therefore, the logic of the defensive function, as the logic of power, is at the very starting point of developing the strategic concept of defence. The role of strategy, as a smart and rational activity, is found in the fact that, according to the environmental conditions, it creates, that is, develops optimal ways of using power to achieve the political goal of state, because, as Mackubin Owens believes, "strategy is a dialogue between politics and national power".⁴²

The phenomena of endangering the vital values of man and state are certainly different in their form, but their essence is the same, violent. Human life and survival are threatened, directly or indirectly, by the violent behaviour of animals and the destructive actions of nature. However, human life, in its natural state, has been the most threatened by the aggressive behaviour of the other man. This forced him to unite and establish a political community in order to restrain the violent behaviour of the people within it. Thus, the state survival has not primarily been threatened by phenomena arising from the instability of its internal structure because within it there is a social order that, through institutional mechanisms, prevents the development of conflicts of people's interests into phenomena that threaten its survival. Thus, the state history shows that the primary form of threat to its survival is the violent, aggressive behaviour of other states, and the source of such behaviour is found in the anarchic structure of the international system.

It is precisely this violent character of phenomena threatening the state survival that defines the logic of its defensive function. It has always been based on the understanding that security, understood as the state survival, is primarily threatened by the use or threat of use of armed force by other states, and that such a form of threat is responded to in the same way. Thus, the state defensive function, throughout the entire history of international relations, has traditionally been considered a military activity, and Colin Gray "identifies such a history with the history of strategy, and that of military strategy. According to him, the history of international relations is the history of warfare".⁴³

In the period of the state-centered and anarchic world order, "the use of armed force, and the fear of its use, were by far among the most powerful influences that shaped the course of international relations and the destinies of states themselves. Today, it is difficult to find a state that has not been established by war, or whose borders have not been established by war outcomes. Almost all states today, with a few exceptions that are minor in order to challenge the rule, have been established, territorially shaped, organized in a systemic manner, strengthened or weakened through the process of implementing a

⁴² Mackubin Thomas Owens, „Strategy and the Strategic Way of Thinking”, gen. quote, p. 114.

⁴³ According to: Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to the Strategic History*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, pp. 1-3.

greater or lesser extent of armed violence".⁴⁴ Since war is a historical constant of state, the role of its defensive mechanism has been assigned to the military, as a state institution of force. Therefore, the state defence, until recently, was exclusively understood within the framework of military activity, and its logic was considered the logic of military power.

In the current period of the state development, the logic of the defensive function has not undergone fundamental changes. The ones that took place within it, however, were the result of the improvement of weapons for waging war and the way of using those weapons, but the logic of the defensive function has always been the same, boiling down to the logic of military power. Therefore, the issue of military power has always occupied a key place in the consideration of relations between states. "Throughout the entire history of international relations, the power of states has been valued by their strength for war, and tested during its waging".⁴⁵ Thus, military power, as the capability to impose the will on an opponent, was a key instrument in achieving foreign policy goals of states. Thus, the state strategy, as its idea of how to protect its security, was exclusively understood as a war or military strategy, and the concept of security was related exclusively to the state security, which, in a much broader understanding of this term today, would be subsumed under the meaning of foreign or military security of state.⁴⁶

However, the wave of globalization has brought about fundamental changes in almost all fields of international reality and social life within states. They have fundamentally changed the understanding of the concept of national security, and thus the understanding of the state defensive function. The answers to the questions of analytical model have changed: what state defends, what it defends against and, lastly, the strategic and conceptual question: how state defends itself. Nowadays, the answers to these questions reflect a completely different, modern reflection of the state defensive function, which deviates greatly from its traditional understanding that is based on the logic of military power. Today, its logic has become much more complex, which can be seen in the strategic concept of comprehensive defence. The basis of this concept is the logic of integration and synchronization of military power with other elements of national power, aimed at complex phenomena threatening survival and other vital interests of state that are no longer exclusively of a military character.

An explanation of why the mentioned changes have occurred can be obtained by considering the issue of the analytical model of the defensive function in the context of the impact of the changed social reality on the reflection of security and defence. If the logic of the state defensive function and the strategic concept of defence have

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Džozef S. Naj, *Paradoks američke moći*, BMG, gen. quote, p. 24.

⁴⁶ As Dragan Simić states, since the establishment of the international system of states, as well as during the entire period of bipolarism, the reality of security was conquered almost exclusively by military concepts, and the main object and subject of security was sovereign state (Dragan R. Simić, *Nauka o bezbednosti: savremeni pristupi bezbednosti*, Službeni list SRJ i Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 2002, p. 23).

fundamentally changed, i.e. if the way in which state defends itself has changed, this indicates changes, first of all, in the nature of phenomena that threaten the subject of the state defence or, on the other hand, there was a mutual change, both in the subject of defence and in what threatens such a subject. The answer to the question of what changes are the basis of the new logic of the defensive function and how it refers to the strategic concept of defence is obtained by considering the issue of how man develops and how that development changes social reality. Namely, these changes are undoubtedly related to such a part of human nature that makes man a conscious being, that enables him to constantly develop and change, to adapt to social reality, and also to adapt that reality to himself.

Human capability to develop and change is explained by man's intellect, which is built on the basis of cognitive capabilities, mind and reason.⁴⁷ Those two capabilities establish complex human needs and shape human behaviour in accordance with a different understanding of the world compared to other beings. They form the basis of the civilizational development of man and the entire human society. Namely, as a mental and rational being, man observes and thinks about the reality in which he exists. In interaction with reality, he gains experience, expands and deepens his knowledge about it. On the basis of this knowledge and experiences, he pragmatically changes reality and adapts it to himself and his needs, which is understood as the civilizational development of man and society. The achievements of science and their implementation in social practice are obvious proof that man changes the reality around him and adapts it to his needs, that is, to his value system that is the basis of those needs. However, on the other hand, under the influence of the changed reality, man himself changes, changing his value system. Thus, he expresses new and different needs within his hierarchical system of needs, striving for continuous improvement of life quality. Therefore, it can be said that the development of man and social reality are in a certain dialectical relationship. One affects the other, and one cannot be understood or explained without the other. In

⁴⁷ "Mind and reason, as two cognitive capabilities, provide a person with the ability to remember, learn, think, evaluate and predict. As such, they make him a thinking, curious, active, rational, as well as creative being, which distinguishes him from other beings. Reason is the capability of rational or logical thinking, understanding and reasoning within the time and space limits of objective reality. It is the human capability to analyse and mentally shape sensory perceptions of reality, to understand and gain knowledge about the laws of phenomena and processes that rule within it. As such, reason represents the stronghold of critical and scientific human thinking. Mind or spirit, on the other hand, as a second and higher cognitive capability, "is not captured by the time and space frames of reality. It goes beyond the limits of the real and enables a person to know something that is irrational, abstract, which cannot be logically explained and understood, like religion or art. The mind, therefore, allows a person to penetrate into the field of the metaphysical, gives them the ability to think about the world much deeper and wider, beyond the physical reality available to senses. As a mental being, man thinks about the essence of the world and himself, therefore, not only about physical survival, but also about the way or quality of his life." (Dušan Višnjić, *Strategija države kao sudbina nacije*, gen. quote, p. 7; Mihajlo Marković, *Logika*, Narodna knjiga, Beograd, 1956, p. 7; Ljubo Ristovski, "Razum levo, um desno", [https:// galaksijanovna.rs/razum-levo-um-desno/](https://galaksijanovna.rs/razum-levo-um-desno/), 25/02/2020).

the closed cyclic process of his development and the development of the environment in which he exists, man continuously changes his value base and accordingly his needs, as well as patterns of thinking and behaviour.

In the community, man has ensured his safety to some extent, but at the same time, he has created the possibility not only to survive, but also to live better. He has started to produce, to create a surplus of material goods that enabled him to have better quality of life. Thus, life in a community has constantly changed the value system of a person, who expressed the desire to further improve the quality of life. This has certainly encouraged him to continue adapting social reality to his increasingly demanding needs. In addition to the fact that life has remained its main, vital and imperishable value, the quality of life has increasingly imposed itself as the other, existentially important human value. Nowadays, in the noticeable absence of a sense of threat to one's survival, the quality of life is imposed even as a vital value. It does not reflect man's desire to enjoy material goods and values, related to his standard of living, but also those that can be called higher values, such as freedom, equality, justice, morals, knowledge, art, etc.

Human needs for those higher values have been unequally satisfied in different eras and societies, and mostly in the Western liberal societies. However, today, in a globalized society, this situation is changing. The quality of life is offered as the reality of every person and every society. Namely, nations have begun to communicate and cooperate more meaningfully, to connect faster and more closely on the basis of economic, cultural, scientific and other cooperation, and out of the inert and limiting state frameworks, that is, at the level of individuals, social groups, organizations, etc. It has certainly contributed to the improvement in the quality of their life. Societies and nations have become more aware of each other, establishing and sharing a common understanding that cooperation, not conflict, is a condition of civilizational development. In such a dimension of international reality, viewed out of the context of still present antagonistic strategic relations between states, the value foundation of global society has been established, stating that war has become an anachronism that no longer has any meaning or purpose in international relations. This has led to certain changes regarding the importance of military power in the world politics, whose use has become limited not only by technological and economic reasons, but also by ethical norms of global society. A general understanding that "military power has experienced a decline in its role in international politics" has emerged.⁴⁸

However, in addition to causing the decline of the role of military power, globalization, on the other hand, has encouraged the increase of the role of other elements of national power in strategic relations between states, especially economic and information power. The economic integration has resulted in greater interdependence of states, and also their vulnerability. Less developed states have

⁴⁸ David A. Baldwin, „Security Studies and the End of the Cold War“, *World Politics*, No. 48, October 1995, p. 118.

become more dependent on developed countries and more susceptible to their influence and political pressure. On the other hand, the development of information technology has closely connected people around the world, and in real time, bypassing the borders of their states. On the other hand, this has enabled the strong influence of states on the public opinion of other states, providing the possibility of undermining their internal cohesion and stability, especially in those states with strongly expressed social, religious, ideological and other social contradictions and inequalities. The aspiration to overcome such inequalities in those states has become the subject of manipulation by other states with the aim of destabilising internal conditions and changing the existing social order.⁴⁹

Thus, the clearly visible differences between the internal and external dynamics of state have disappeared. They have become permeated with each other, creating unique dynamics, which state has no longer had sovereign control over as in the previous period. Many internal issues of state have become subject to external influences, so the previously present difference between the internal and external state values has disappeared. Today, justice, freedom, equality and the other so-called internal state values have become important in its external existential environment, in interaction with other states. Namely, they have become exposed to the subversive influence of other states in order to create internal destabilisation and change *status quo* of state in international relations. Territorial integrity, as a vital state value, has lost its former primacy as the subject of the state defence. Today, it is no longer necessary to occupy the opponent's territory militarily in order to make an impact on destroying his will and accepting someone else's. It can be destroyed by internal destabilisation of society, using non-military instruments of power.

Although war conflicts have not disappeared from the international scene, it has been shown that non-military forms of threatening security have become powerful weapons of states in the period of the globalized economy and global information society. In such circumstances, the state strategy has been forced to adapt to new changes. Analogous to a man, who adapts his behaviour to the norms of the social environment, state has been forced to adapt its defensive behaviour to the changed conditions of the modern strategic environment. Consequently, the state defensive strategy has undergone fundamental changes in its conceptual approach. Now it has had to respond to the complexity of modern threatening phenomena of a military and non-military character. Thus, the logic of the defensive function of state has deviated from its traditional understanding as the logic of military power, and the defensive function itself has gone beyond the framework of its understanding as a military activity. Therefore, in the time of fundamental changes in the characteristics of the strategic environment, the strategic concept of defence is based on the logic of integration and synchronization of military power with other elements of national

⁴⁹ This is clearly indicated by the so-called colour revolutions in the post-Cold War period of international reality.

power. Undoubtedly, military power still remains existentially important for state, but it has ceased to be its key instrument in achieving its foreign policy goals.

The aforementioned considerations indicate that the development of the strategic concept of comprehensive defence is based on changes, both in the value base of states and in the phenomena that threaten such a subject. Viewed from the aspect of changes in the values that are defended, what appears as a trend in the contemporary defence thinking of states is that the quality of life takes precedence over the traditionally understood vital values of state, such as territorial integrity or even sovereignty. Therefore, the quality of life has imposed itself as a new vital value of state, which, as such, has become the subject of its defence. "However, this trend differs between developed and developing countries. It began much earlier with developed countries that have a high living standard and rationally do not expect to be militarily threatened by other countries"⁵⁰. Developing countries, on the other hand, view this value as a path to their development and survival. Nowadays, the quality of life is necessary for achieving internal stability and eliminating potential possibilities for external threats to the state vital values.

In the current period of globalization of international relations and redefinition of the concept of national security, the strategic culture of states has consequently changed. It changes for the same reasons that the logic and the strategic concept of defence change. The reasons for these changes should be sought in the changed way in which man perceives security, how he thinks and how he behaves in order to achieve it, and this is certainly conditioned by his nature, which makes him a conscious and developing being. Namely, great changes in social reality, which have been stimulated by the development of man, have undoubtedly reflected on the pattern of thinking and behaviour of state in the field of defence, which, more than two millennia ago, that is, since the very beginning of state, has been related to the issue of military power and the use of armed force.⁵¹ The post-Cold War reality has caused changes in the way of reflecting and practicing the defensive function as a primarily military activity, even in those countries that until now have considered defensive functions exclusively with a technocentric and conventional approach. In the strategic reflection of the state defence, there are increasingly present demands

⁵⁰ Vojin Dimitrijević, „Bezbednost i politička zajednica“, in: Miroslav Hadžić (ed.), *Reforma sektora bezbednosti*, Institut G17, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Beograd, 2003, p. 34.

⁵¹ The concept of strategic culture has indicated how the cultural pattern of a nation, as a relatively permanent category, influences its reflection and practice of the use of armed force. The questions that strategic culture has dealt with so far have been, among others: how the culture of some nations shapes their thinking and practice of using armed force to deter potential aggressors, while the cultures of other nations encourage the aggressive use of armed force and threatening the survival of other nations. Likewise, it has considered the question of whether the culture of certain nations affects the use of all national resources for defence or whether only the capacities of the professional armed forces are used. Nowadays, such an approach is changing, i.e. supplemented with new questions, such as: why the role of military power in international relations has declined or how a relatively permanent cultural pattern of reflection and use of armed force changes under the strong influence of the context of a globalized society.

for the integration of military power with other elements of national power. Since the strategic concept of defence should respond to those requirements, its adaptation to the newly emerging changes conditions the modification of the current pattern of the state defensive behaviour, based on the logic of military power. Thus, the strategic culture of states, narrowly understood as a "military culture" or "the culture of the use of armed force", is undoubtedly changing.

The change of strategic culture, however, is not manifested equally in all countries. It is the least present with great military powers. This leads to the conclusion that the reflection and practice of the state defensive function is a reflection of its subjective sense of the objective reality within which its interests are achieved or threatened. In other words, the defensive function reflects the state subjective perception of its vulnerability, which, consequently, affects the development of its idea or concept of how to respond and counter threatening phenomena. Depending on how far the state subjectivism deviates from reality, such a concept can be, more or less, effective in its implementation. The state subjectivism in the perception of objective reality results from their geopolitical or strategic code. It is understood in relations of how state views itself, how it views other states and finally how it views itself in relation to other states. "Such a consideration includes the understanding of current threats, the experience of superiority or inferiority, achievement or deprivation, respect or disparagement, leadership or subservience, predestination, etc."⁵² This image of oneself in relation to others can often deviate from reality, and as such, it obscures and makes it difficult for states to think rationally and choose an adequate defence concept. It can be concluded that not all countries are equally sensitive to changes in social reality, nor, accordingly, they are equally ready to adapt to it, although there is often a need for it. The great powers that possess strong military potential and whose foreign policy is traditionally based on the policy of force are particularly not ready for these changes.

Conclusion

For more than two millennia, the logic of the state defensive function has not undergone fundamental changes. The ones that took place within it, however, were a consequence of the improvement of weapons for waging war and the way of their use, but the logic of the defensive function has always been the same - it has boiled down to the logic of military power. In the period of the state-centric world order, the use of armed force and the fear of its use, were among the strongest influences that shaped the course of international relations and the destinies of states themselves. Therefore, the issues of military power and the use of armed force have occupied a

⁵² Zoran Kilibarda, *Osnovi geopolitike*, Fakultet bezbednosti, JP Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2008, p. 19.

key place in the consideration of interstate relations. However, today, in the time of globalization of international relations and the noticeable “disintegration” of the state-centric world order, military power is going through a period of a great decline in its role in the world politics, with other types of power occupying a more important place in strategic relations between states.

The source of these changes should be sought in man, that is, in such a part of his nature that encourages him to constantly develop. In the closed cyclic process of his development and the development of the environment in which he exists, man has changed his value system and expressed different needs. At the same time, he has changed the patterns of his reflection and behaviour, certainly the one related to thinking and practicing the state defensive function, as well. Therefore, the defensive function is nothing else, but a reflection of human cognition of social reality, which man uses to express his need for security and thinks about how to achieve that security. Millennia ago, this question was related to military power. However, as social reality has changed greatly with the development and activities of man, as a result, human view of the issues which values state defends, what they are defended against and finally the way in which they are defended, has also changed.

The paper concludes that the state defensive function, until recently, was based on those values and defensive behaviour of man that was characteristic of his natural state. In such a state, the main value that man defended was life, that is, his survival, while aggressive or violent behaviour was recognized both in his defensive behaviour and in the behaviour by which a person threatened the survival of the other person. Analogous to him, survival and aggressive behaviour were the foundations of the state defensive function. However, in recent decades, the civilizational development of man and society has changed the priorities in the values that state defends, as well as the character of the phenomena that threaten those values. Namely, in modern global relations, in addition to survival, the quality of life is imposed as another vital value and defensive interest of state, and in strategic relations between states, non-military phenomena of threats to their defensive interests are increasingly gaining in importance.

Since the values that state defends are no longer only those that arise from the natural state of man, i.e. survival, and that threats to those values are no longer exclusively military or violent, the defence strategy is faced with the task of adapting to new changes and adequately responding to the complex threats of the modern strategic environment. These are the reasons for the fundamental changes of the logic of the state defensive function, and these changes can be noticed in the strategic concept of comprehensive defence, which is based on the logic of the integration and synchronization of military power with other elements of national power, aimed at complex phenomena threatening the vital state interests. This is gradually changing the strategic culture of states, which until now has been narrowly understood as “a military culture” or “the culture of the use of armed force”.

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Свеобухватна одбрана и стратешка култура кроз призму човека

Проблемски оквир рада указује на то да је у периоду глобализације међународних односа дошло до промена у промишљању и практиковању одбрамбене функције државе као војне делатности. Индикатор тих промена препознаје се у развоју и примени стратегијског концепта свеобухватне одбране, који одступа од традиционалне логике одбрамбене функције државе као логике војне моћи. Полазећи од наведеног проблема, предмет истраживања усмерен је ка питањима зашто и како се логика одбрамбене функције променила и како те промене утичу на стратегијски концепт одбране и стратешку културу држава. У раду се полази од тезе да је цивилизацијски развој човека условио промену вредности које држава брани, као и природу појава којима се те вредности угрожавају, што је резултирало променом логике одбрамбене функције државе, њеног стратегијског концепта и стратешке културе. У доказивању наведене тезе користи се аналогија одбрамбених функција човека и државе. Наиме, разматра се како комплексна природа човека, као биолошког и свесног бића, обликује људски механизам одбране, а сазнањем шта је предмет одбране човека и како он тај предмет брани аналогијом се изводе закључци о истим питањима одбрамбене функције државе. У раду се долази до закључка да се одбрамбена функција државе, све донедавно, заснивала на оним вредностима и одбрамбеном понашању човека које је било карактеристично за његово природно стање, дакле на опстанку и агресивном понашању. Међутим, последњих деценија, цивилизацијски развој човека и друштва изменио је приоритете у вредностима које држава брани, као и природу појава којима се те вредности угрожавају. Тиме је, последично, промењено одбрамбено понашање државе. Наиме, у савременим глобалним односима, поред опстанка, квалитет живота се намеће као друга кључна вредност и одбрамбени интерес државе. С друге стране, у стратегијским односима између држава, невојне појаве угрожавања њихових одбрамбених интереса све више добијају на значају. Као одговор на наведене промене, стратегијски концепт одбране заснива се на свеобухватној одбрани, односно на логици интеграције војне моћи са другим елементима националне моћи. Тиме се постепено мења стратешка култура државе, која је до сада уско схватана као „војна култура” или „култура употребе оружане силе”.

Кључне речи: *природа човека, људски механизам одбране, одбрамбена функција државе, стратегијски концепт одбране, свеобухватна одбрана, стратешка култура*