

STRATEGIC STUDIES IN THE SERVICE OF HEGEMONY: A VIEW OF STRATEGIC CULTURE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SECOND GENERATION

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This paper is dedicated to the second generation of the so-called cultural strategists, whose contribution to the development of the concept of strategic culture and the study of strategy as a form of discourse is largely unjustly neglected, especially when it comes to the most prominent representative of the entire generation – Bradley Klein. Klein's Neo-Gramscian approach to strategic studies remains the underused scientific potential that can contribute to a better understanding of international relations and international security. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to acquaint the reader with Klein's critical interpretation of strategic culture, viewed as a discursive instrument of the hegemony of political and military elites, and to emphasize the importance of his analysis of strategic discourse, intensely marginalized in this subdiscipline.

Key words: strategic studies, strategic culture, international relations, second generation, Bradley Klein, hegemony, strategic discourse, critical theory, Antonio Gramsci

Introduction

Since Jack L. Snyder introduced the concept of strategic culture as a new factor in the strategic calculation of the Bloc nuclear warfare in the second half of the 1970s,¹ the idea of deep-rooted and time-resistant strategic preferences has not ceased to be the centre of gathering of those theorists who view strategy, strategic thinking and strategic action as a result of “the educational processes of

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¹ See: Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Options*, A project Air Force report prepared for the United States, RAND Corporation R-2154-AF, Santa Monica, CA, 1977.

the social construction”.² Although originally developed as an analytical instrument tasked with providing the military and political establishment with a reliable assessment of the assertive potential of the Soviet nuclear strategy, Snyder’s concept soon found its place in academic thinking of international relations, especially among theorists interested in international security and strategic studies.³

Today, proponents of a cultural approach to strategy study focus on how “elites and decision-makers assess and interpret the main features of the international system in which they operate and how those assessments affect their views on security policy, and in particular the use of military power”.⁴ As Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka⁵ notice, this is an approach interested in “perception, beliefs, ideas and norms that guide national security elites in their task of classifying strategic priorities that will form the firm basis of foreign and security policies of a state”. The mentioned preferences together form patterns of strategic culture “written” throughout history through the early establishment experiences of a state,⁶ that is, (political) community that preceded it. These patterns then, as a state and its elite mature, become a part of the process of long duration (*longue duree*),⁷ during which

² Colin S. Gray, „Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation Strikes Back” in Colin S. Gray, *Strategy and History: Essays on theory and practice*, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p. 152.

³ Strategic studies can be defined as an interdisciplinary approach to international security that takes as a conceptual starting point the ideas of civil and military strategists on threat and the use of force and power to accomplish political goals. Isabelle Duyvesteyn, James E. Worrall, “Global strategic studies: a manifesto”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Routledge, London and New York, 2016, p. 2. More on the complex relationship of this subdiscipline with the science of international relations and security studies, see: Hedley Bull, “Strategic studies and its Critics”, *World politics*, Vol. 20, no. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968, p. 596; Robert Ayson, “Strategic Studies”, in Christian Reus Smith, Duncan Snidal (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of International Relations*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 571; Barry Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies - Military Technology & International Relations*, Macmillan for International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1987, p. 3.

⁴ Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, „Grand Strategy, Strategic Culture, Practice: The Social Roots of Nordic Defence”, *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association*, Vol. 40, Issue 1, SAGE, 2005, p. 6.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶ Although most theorists agree that the roots of strategic culture should be sought in the past, i.e. in the so-called “formative” historical experience, some theorists, such as Jeffrey Legro or Elizabeth Kier, do not share this view. According to their interpretation, strategic culture is rooted in “recent” experiences and is the result of changes in the domicile political context. Alastair I. Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, pp. 41-42.

⁷ The process of long duration (French: *longue durée*) is the name for the historical and economic approach to social events whose most prominent advocate is Fernand Braudel. Braudel views social events not as events, but as consequences of “permanent processes”, i.e. “slow evolving social structure”. Fernand Braudel, *On History*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982, pp. 25-55.

they are exposed to a range of political, philosophical, cultural and other cognitive factors that ultimately result in a particular strategic culture. Most theorists agree that once strategic culture is established, it remains exposed to the mentioned factors, which means that its changes are still possible, but they are also very slow, over longer periods.

In an effort to present the different stages as concisely as possible, as well as the differences in the theoretical and methodological approach, Alastair I. Johnston divided the theoreticians of strategic culture into three "generations".⁸ The first generation includes the authors such as Snyder, Colin S. Gray and David Jones, who are credited with pioneering endeavours in the field of the study of strategic culture. According to Johnston, the second generation includes the authors such as Bradley S. Klein or Reginald C. Stuart, close to postmodern and postpositivist thought, which spread in social sciences in the late 1970s and during 1980s, which neither the science of international relations nor security studies remained immune to. Finally, the third generation of theorists, in which, among others, he included himself, Johnston views as revisionists of previous achievements in the field of strategic culture.

This paper is dedicated to the second generation of the so-called cultural strategists, whose contribution to the development of the concept of strategic culture and the study of strategy as a form of discourse is largely unjustly neglected, especially when it comes to the most prominent representative of the entire generation - Bradley Klein. Klein's critical interpretation of strategic culture, viewed as a discursive instrument of the hegemony of political and military elites, remains the underused potential in the field of strategic studies. Klein's approach to strategic studies can contribute not only to the further development of theoretical and methodological models for researching the interaction of culture and strategic behaviour, as well as the discursive dimension of military strategies, but his insights can help to better understand the true nature of the intentions hidden behind the "curtain" of the so-called declarative strategies in practice, that is, during strategic decision-making and planning. The first chapter of this paper will briefly present the most important ideas of the leading representatives of each of the mentioned generations, the basic characteristics of their debates and the main points of mutual disputes. The second and third chapter are dedicated to a detailed consideration of Klein's (critical) interpretation of strategic culture as an instrument of power projection, i.e. the use of strategic culture to accomplish the US global hegemony. In the fourth chapter, the focus is on the use of strategy as a discourse of war, i.e. strategic discourse, which global military elites use to consensually shape both national political and international environment in accordance with their interests, that is, the needs of military organizational culture.

⁸ Alastair I. Johnston, gen. quote.

One concept, three different points of view

Inspired by Bernard Brodie's claim that good strategy has to include sociological and anthropological insights,⁹ "the Snyder's cohort", as pioneers of the study of strategic culture are called by Neumann and Heikka,¹⁰ went beyond military strategies and game theory models that the paradigmatic space of strategic studies was limited by in the first decades of the Cold War. Thus, after Stephen M. Walt's "Golden Age" of security studies and generations of civil strategists responsible for strategic calculations and nuclear doctrines based on the theory of rational choice,¹¹ the first generation of researchers interested in the cultural aspect of strategic studies came on the scene.¹²

The authors such as Gray and Jones laid the theoretical foundations of the concept of strategic culture and gave the first methodological guidelines for its use, positioning themselves as the *mainstream* in this field. These are a kind of "patriarchs" of research on the cultural preconditions of strategic thinking and behaving, who based their approach to the problem on two key assumptions: 1. the idea that different security communities make different strategic choices in the same security environment due to cultural differences; 2. the already mentioned definition of strategic culture as a result of the *longue duree* process, i.e. on the assumption of the survival of certain strategic preferences during long time intervals. As the main subject of interest of the first generation was the Soviet Union, the mentioned ideas served as a signpost for a better understanding of Moscow's strategic behaviour and a more reliable prediction of its future moves on the nuclear chessboard.

Starting from Snyder's definition of strategic culture as a set of ideas, emotionally conditioned reactions and patterns of behaviour that members of a national strategic community acquire through instructions or imitation,¹³ Gray and Jones continued to enrich this innovative strategic concept. They attributed the differences in the nuclear strategies of the United States and the Soviet Union to "unique variations in macro-environment variables, such as deep-rooted historical experience, political culture and geography."¹⁴

Speaking from the position of a passionate advocate of the importance of cultural context and national style, Gray "defines strategic culture as a form of thinking and acting related to the use of force, which arises from the perception of national

⁹ Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

¹¹ Stephen M. Walt, "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1991, pp. 214-215.

¹² Alastair I. Johnston, *gen.quote*, p. 36.

¹³ Jack Snyder, *gen.quote*, p. 8.

¹⁴ Alastair I. Johnston, *gen.quote*, p. 36.

historical experience of striving for self-determination and a state of special experiences".¹⁵ Following Snyder's thesis that habitual and cognitive behaviour overlap in the field of strategic decision-making,¹⁶ Gray views strategic culture as a kind of "fusion" of culture and behaviour, i.e. at the same time as a (cultural) context that forms strategic behaviour and as an integral part of such behaviour,¹⁷ whereby strategic behaviour means "behaviour relevant to threat or the use of force to achieve political goals".¹⁸ He points out that strategic culture can be thought of in two ways – as a rich and distilled external source of influence that can "produce" behaviour, and alternatively (or in addition) – as a social construct made by people and institutions that behave to some extent in accordance with certain patterns of (security) culture.¹⁹ Gray, therefore, gives a complex definition of strategic culture that leaves the possibility of interpreting it as an "external" context that surrounds and gives meaning to strategic behaviour, or as the totality of the basis of intertwined strategic issues, and both of them".²⁰ However, his interpretative flexibility is only apparent, as he believes that very small conceptual space remains for the interpretation of strategic behaviour out of the framework of strategic culture. In fact, "such conceptual space cannot exist because every strategic behaviour is influenced by human beings, who have no choice, but to act as cultural actors".²¹ This kind of *rigor*, which the first generation of strategic culture theorists expressed on the issue of the relationship between culture and behaviour, a decade and a half later will lead to a great debate with the next generation of strategic "culturologists", who are considered to be the members of the "third generation".²²

However, before the Gray-Johnston debate took a hold and shook up the community of culturally oriented "strategists", strategic culture became the subject of interest of those authors who considered the relationship between culture and strategy from a post-structural point of view and from a critical theory point of view.²³ The second generation, as Johnston called it, was interested in studying "the interdependence between symbolic discourse, strategic culture and the behaviour of states in international politics".²⁴ This generation gathered theorists

¹⁵ Stanislav Stojanović, "Posebnost odnosa strateške kulture i strategije", *Vojno delo*, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, Beograd, 8/2019, p. 32.

¹⁶ Jack Snyder, gen. quote, p. 9.

¹⁷ Colin S. Gray, gen. quote, p. 151.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 151-152.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

²² Alastair I. Johnston, gen. quote, pp. 41-43.

²³ Edward Lock, "Refining strategic culture: return of the second generation", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 36, Issue 3, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010, p. 696.

²⁴ Veljko Blagojević, "Strateška kultura i nacionalna bezbednost", *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, LXX, No. 170, Matica srpska, Novi Sad, 2019, p. 169.

who viewed strategic culture, above all, “as a tool of political hegemony in the field of strategic decision-making”.²⁵ For authors such as Bradley Klein, Reginald Stuart and Robin Luckham, the starting point of the research was the distinction between “declarative and secret doctrine”,²⁶ i.e. the idea of a gap between what decision-makers think they do or claim to do when they act strategically, and deeper motives that drive them to act the way they do.²⁷ By separating the fields of “declarative” and “secret/real”, the second generation separated the concept of strategic culture from behaviour,²⁸ thus distancing theoretically and methodologically, and not only ideologically, from its predecessors. The most influential and most frequently mentioned author of this generation is, of course, Bradley Klein, whose name has become a kind of synonym for a critical and linguistic approach to the problem of strategic culture. Inspired by the post-structural theories of Michel Foucault, Rob J. B. Walker and Richard K. Ashley, as well as the Neo-Marxist thought of Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox, Klein saw in strategic culture an instrument which ruling elites use to broaden orientation towards violence and legitimize different models of using force against alleged enemies. Analyzing the Cold War policy of the US, Klein concludes that “real operational strategies emphasize warfare in order to defend the US hegemony, while declarative doctrines serve political elites as an instrument for obtaining culturally and linguistically acceptable justification of operational (real) strategy, and silencing or leading to the wrong path of a potential political opponent”.²⁹ For Klein, the study of strategic culture is merely the study of the cultural hegemony of organized state violence.³⁰

Although Klein and his like-minded people took a strictly critical attitude towards the concept of strategic culture, more precisely, towards its role in the strategic decision-making process, there has never been a fierce debate between the first and second generation of cultural direction in strategic studies. The reason for this is the fact that the second generation was more focused on the analysis and criticism of the US Cold War strategic *praxis*, and that it referred less to the theses of its predecessors. Focused mainly on discourse analysis and decoding security narratives that can be found in strategic documents and defence manuals, the focus of the research by the second generation theorists was both on local and global

²⁵ Alastair I. Johnston, gen. quote, p. 39.

²⁶ Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, gen. quote, p. 8.

²⁷ Alastair I. Johnston, gen. quote, p. 39.

²⁸ Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995, p. 17; Asle Toje, „Strateška kultura kao analitički alat“, *Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana*, No. 14, Centar za civilno-vojne odnose, Beograd, 2009, p. 6.

²⁹ Alastair I. Johnston, „Thinking about Strategic Culture“, gen. quote, p. 39.

³⁰ Bradley S. Klein, „Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics“, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988, p. 136.

consequences of the militarization of political and strategic discourse, which aims to promote cultural hegemony of ruling elites. The second generation of the researchers of strategic culture was therefore more interested in social criticism and revealing the political background of the practice of military echelons than they cared about academic “superiority”.

The real theoretical and methodological debate would spark between members of the third and first generation,³¹ after Johnston’s paper entitled “Thinking about Strategic Culture” was published in the prestigious scientific journal *International Security* in the mid-1990s. This text initiated an internal dialogue between proponents of the concept of strategic culture, during which the third and first generation most prominent representatives - Johnston and Gray – provided a “dynamic theoretical discussion, which interrupted earlier debates and provided the strongest bases for further work”.³² Johnston’s view of strategic culture is directly related to the “legacy” left to the new generation of researchers by Gray and Jones, and also implies great corrections to their theoretical and methodological framework, which again raises the question of the relationship between strategic culture and strategic behaviour. However, the details of Johnston’s ideas will not be discussed because they go far beyond the thematic framework of this paper. First of all, his views on the possibilities of strategic culture instrumentalization,³³ as well as segments of the research work by Elizabeth Kier, another prominent representative of the third generation, dedicated to military organizational culture are important for this research focus.³⁴

It is important to emphasize that in the mentioned text, Johnston referred to the second generation only incidentally, in a much milder polemical tone, reproaching it, mainly, for its vagueness regarding the influence of strategic culture (equated with symbolic discourse) on behaviour. Johnston draws attention to the fact that Klein and his like-minded people imply that decision-making elites can rise above limitations conditioned by strategic culture, and that they can freely manipulate it.³⁵ Such a “scenario” is unlikely for representatives of the third generation because they believe that “elites also socialize in the strategic culture they produce, and

³¹ For more on the debate, see: Dušan Kesić, “Koncept strateške kulture u studijama bezbednosti”, *Godišnjak Fakulteta bezbednosti* 2019, Fakultet bezbednosti Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd, 2019, pp. 161-163.

³² Milan Igrutinović, “Blumfildov model podkultura i moguća primena u razumevanju strateške kulture Srbije”, *Vojno delo*, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, Beograd, 8/2019, p. 275.

³³ Alastair I. Johnston, gen. quote, p. 38.

³⁴ See: Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1997, pp. 3-6; Elizabeth Kier, „War and Reform: Gaining Labor’s Compliance on the Homefront” in Elizabeth Kier, Ronald R. Krebs (eds.), *In War’s Wake: International Conflict and the Fate of Liberal Democracy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, New York, 2010, pp. 139-160.

³⁵ Alastair I. Johnston, gen. quote, p. 40.

therefore may be limited by symbolic myths made by their predecessors”.³⁶ In any case, to Klein’s legacy, although he spared him harsh criticism, Johnston paid much less attention than the legacy of Gray and Jones. On the other hand, Gray’s response,³⁷ which came a few years later, focused the argument exclusively on Johnston, completely ignoring Klein’s research, which was somewhat expected, as the two authors had diametrical views on the role of strategic studies in international politics.

Strategic culture as power projection

Within the ideational corpus of strategic studies, Bradley Klein is positioned as a ruthless critic of the “strategic” vision of the world order and the West-centric bias of this subdiscipline. He views strategic studies primarily as an instrument of legitimizing the global hegemony of (Western) political and military elites, which use them as a kind of “the world map where Western societies always end up on the good side”.³⁸ Unlike authors who view strategic studies as a theoretical “diagnosis” of the reality in which we live, Klein believes that this subdiscipline has a much more practical and assertive role. This role goes beyond the framework of academic “theorizing” and moves into the field of political construction of security practices.³⁹ Invoking scientific objectivity and neutrality for him is nothing but hiding the true essence under the carpet of apology because for apologists for strategic studies, such as Hedley Bull or Colin Gray, violence, conflicts and use of military force to accomplish political goals are nothing else, but a reflection of the reality that results from the established practice of the world politics.⁴⁰ On the contrary, Klein insists on the “fact” that strategic studies are not just a silent observer, which simply confirms the presence of violence in the world politics, but that by encouraging or prohibiting its use, as well as recommending its modalities “defined” in accordance with some goals, actively participate in its development. Therefore, strategic studies are “an essential component in the articulation of the world order in terms of creating and

³⁶ Ibid, p. 40.

³⁷ See: Colin S. Gray, gen.quote.

³⁸ Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, p. 5

³⁹ Klein believes that during the 1950s, the subdiscipline of strategic studies became a formative force crucial to transatlantic policy, and that its “export” from the United States to Western Europe was crucial to establishing a balanced approach to the Cold War strategy among Atlantic allies. Bradley S. Klein, “How the West Was One: Representational Politics of NATO”, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Wiley, Hoboken, New Jersey, 1990, p. 317.

⁴⁰ Columba Peoples, „Strategic studies and its Critics”, in John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, Colin S. Gray (eds.), *Strategy in the Contemporary world - An introduction to Strategic Studies*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019, p. 357.

perpetuating a global political vision in which Western values, institutions and political economy are valorized”⁴¹

Although Klein is best known for his book “Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence”, the segment of his work directly related to the problem of strategic culture and strategic discourse is more interesting for this paper. In his book “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defense Policy”, Klein bases his critical view of the world order on the analysis of strategic culture. Starting from the established practice of strategic studies to view their research subject - states and their mutual security alliances as the facts as old as the first relations between states, he notes that the principles that support modern international interactions are interpreted in the light of the same rules of governance, which were described by Thucydides in “The History of the Peloponnesian War”. It is a state-centric view of politics, elaborated in detail by Niccolo Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, and whose continuity can be followed to modern realists. Its focus is on *Leviathan*, the state that is superior to citizens, their economy and culture. Such a state is a precondition for the existence of political and military strategies that are possible only in conditions “in which a state apparatus that coordinates political life is established and which then takes responsibility for dealing with the strict limitations of the inevitably conflicting world inhabited by legitimate entities [states] that are structured in a similar way”.⁴² Therefore, for realists, who are the dominant current among theorists of strategic studies, the issue of hegemony becomes one of the main ones. In their eyes, hegemony is a concept that implies a radical difference between rules that govern within a society and rules that govern an international society. The field of national politics is viewed as relatively unproblematic, unitary and consensual, while the picture of international relations is its essential contrast - the realm of anarchy in which unrest and chaos reign.⁴³ One of the greatest living realists, John J. Mearsheimer, notices that the great powers that shape international system are afraid of each other and therefore compete for power.⁴⁴ Their ultimate goal is “to gain a dominant position over others because that is the best way to ensure their own survival. Power ensures security, and the greatest power ensures the greatest security.”⁴⁵ Hence, for most realists, the essence of hegemony does not lie in domination itself, but in the fact that it can ensure international and national security in conditions in which, in Hobbesian terms, everyone is a wolf to everybody.

⁴¹ Bradley S. Klein, *Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence*, ibid, p. 41.

⁴² Bradley S. Klein, “Hegemony and Strategic Culture: American Power Projection and Alliance Defence Politics”, gen.quote, p. 133.

⁴³ Ibid, p. 134.

⁴⁴ Džon Miršajmer, *Tragedija politike velikih sila*, Udruženje za studije SAD u Srbiji, Čigoja štampa, Beograd, 2017, p. 21.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 21.

Unlike realists, Klein deals with the issue of hegemony from the critical perspective of Gramsci's (Neo) Marxism. Gramsci views hegemony as political leadership based on the spontaneous adherence of masses to the direction of social life defined by the dominant social group.⁴⁶ This consent "is 'historically' caused by prestige (and consequently trust) that the dominant group enjoys due to its position and function in the world of production".⁴⁷ Simply, it is "a system of class association in which 'the hegemonic class' takes over political leadership over 'subordinate classes' by 'gaining' them".⁴⁸ For Gramsci, the concept of hegemony is not conditioned by strict dichotomies such as the aforementioned divisions into "internal and external", "national and foreign" or "state and system". It is a system of relations that does not know the mentioned binary distinctions, but holistically permeates both internal and external dimension of politics. It is important to point out that, contrary to realistic one, the focus of Gramsci's definition of hegemony is on "political production of the relation of domination through which he normalizes class rule and 'experiences' it as legitimate",⁴⁹ and for him the state supremacy to civil society is no timeless universal "givenness", but rather "a special historical achievement characteristic for modern class rule, which the culturally and intellectually sophisticated bourgeoisie uses seeking to integrate subordinate classes, and to do so in a consensual way rather than by coercion".⁵⁰

Klein points out that the discussion on the nature of hegemony between realists and neorealists, on the one hand, and proponents of critical theory, on the other, is primarily focused on the field of international political economy, and that the issue of war and military strategy has remained out of focus of this debate. He believes that Neo-Gramscians, like Robert Cox, have focused on the role of transnational capital and international economic regimes, ignoring the importance of strategic studies and treating them as a mere "ideological endeavour that completely exists on the structures of international trade".⁵¹ Such an underestimating attitude, Klein notices, is a missing opportunity to explore mechanisms that ruling elites use to control military power in order to secure their access to the world markets and strengthen the global order they have constructed by expanding the concept of hegemony. He believes that this omission has to be corrected, and that further research of the phenomenon of hegemony has to be directed towards explaining "the way in which

⁴⁶ Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (eds.), *Selections from the prison notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, International Publishers, New York, 1992, pp. 13-14; Thomas R. Bates, "Gramsci and the Theory of Hegemony", *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol. 36, No. 2, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1975, pp. 352.

⁴⁷ Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, gen.quote, p. 13.

⁴⁸ Valeriano Ramos, Jr., "Pojmovi ideologija, hegemonija i organski intelektualac u Gramšijevoj teoriji marksizma", u Antonio Gramši, *Intelektualci, kultura, hegemonija*, Meditteran Publishing, Novi Sad, 2018, p. 124.

⁴⁹ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 134.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 135

the West under the US auspices has managed to legitimize its extraordinary - and increasing - contribution to the pathology of the world military order".⁵² Such an explanation would require that the concept of strategic culture is taken as a starting point in further research of hegemony, i.e. military strategy should be considered primarily as a cultural practice.

While *mainstream* strategic culturologists seek to explain the impact of national cultural patterns on "a unique way of analysing, interpreting, and reacting to international reality",⁵³ Klein goes a step further, focusing on strategic culture as "a finished product", that is, an instrument by which state legitimizes use of military power in order to protect and reproduce the lifestyle it promotes.⁵⁴ It is the concept whose meaning is directed towards the way in which modern hegemonic state disposes and manages its forces internationally, and which includes the following strategic factors: 1. military style, understood as a product of military institutions of a state, or as accumulation of strategic traditions of its land, naval and air force power; 2. technological infrastructure and armaments sector; 3. political ideologies, which help by public discourse to define situations in which use of military force is necessary.⁵⁵ These factors, Klein notes, indicate that the phenomenon of strategic culture is closely related to geopolitical position of some state, as well as its relations with allies and opponents. Moreover, they say that strategic culture implies not only state predisposition towards a certain "style" of warfare, but also what precedes warfare - the process of its preparation for the use of force. The level of economic, technological and institutional development, as well as the way in which the use of force is justified in the context of political debate, are extremely important for this process.⁵⁶ At this point, Klein fulfills his intention to expand the Neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony. His conceptual scope is much wider than the one by Cox and goes far beyond a set of political and economic preferences. Klein also integrates "widely available orientations towards violence and ways in which state can legitimately use force against alleged enemies".⁵⁷ Therefore, he views strategic culture as "a political network of interpretations in which strategic practices gain meaning".⁵⁸ This network, as Lock notices, shapes military practice of state, presenting certain strategic practices as legitimate and possible, while denying legitimacy to others or presenting them as unfeasible.⁵⁹

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Milinko Vračar, Goran Stanojević, "Strateška kultura Srbije i koncept totalne odbrane", *Vojno delo*, Ministarstvo odbrane Republike Srbije, Beograd, 8/2019, p. 297.

⁵⁴ Similar criticism of strategic studies has occurred before, even during the so-called "Golden Age" of this subdiscipline. See, e.g., Anatol Raport, *Strategies and Conscience*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964.

⁵⁵ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 136.

⁵⁶ Edward Lock, gen.quote, p. 697; Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 136.

⁵⁷ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote.

⁵⁸ Lock, gen.quote, p. 697.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

Strategic culture in the service of the US hegemony

From all the above-mentioned, it follows from the already mentioned Klein's attitude that the study of strategic culture is nothing else, but the study of the cultural hegemony of organized state violence. To illustrate this interpretation, Klein takes the Cold War foreign and security policy. Analysing the historical and ideological roots of the US strategic culture, he views its essence in "power projection", that is, in its ability to reach space far beyond its national borders with its military force. The US power projection is possible owing to its conventional military forces (especially the Navy and Air Force) and nuclear arsenal at its disposal. Its main characteristic is reflected in military potential for the use of "enormous" destructive force during hostilities abroad. Another important feature lies in the fact that the United States, due to its geographical position (i.e. separation from the rest of the world by the Atlantic-Pacific water barrier, as well as land borders with two military inferior states - Mexico and Canada), can wage strictly controlled wars abroad and conduct them in an "orderly", "clean" and surgically precise way, thus enabling its population to "remain deeply, truly morally, confident in its, above all, defensive nature".⁶⁰ Hence, Klein's analysis of the US strategic culture can boil down to emphasizing the following hegemonic imperative: to develop the potential for lethal and destructive offensive actions abroad, while local population has to remain steadfast in "faith" in the defensive nature of their country's military machinery. He notices that such strategic culture is entirely possible owing to the fact that the US is the state "that always goes to war 'somewhere', across the sea".⁶¹ Hence "the aseptic" scenario of warfare, in which everything is "under control", "neat" and "clean", and in which there is no space for unforeseen circumstances, is the result of culture "that has never experienced the consequences of mechanized warfare, whose cities have never been bombed, whose country has never been overrun by modern armies, and which has not only been spared the horrors of World War II, but has emerged as the strongest post-war power in terms of industry, economic growth and ideological self-confidence".⁶²

In compliance with his critical observation of the nature and origin of the US strategic culture, Klein draws analogous conclusions about the true nature of nuclear deterrence strategy. Since it lost military advantage of nuclear weapons exclusivity soon after the end of World War II, the United States has faced, for the first time in recent history, with the fact that its territory could be threatened by another country's combat activities and its citizens, cities and the entire

⁶⁰ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 136.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid, p. 139.

infrastructure could face the devastating power of the Soviet nuclear strike. To avoid this danger, a deterrent strategy has been developed. Not as a strategy of war, but as a strategy of keeping peace. Its essence is in the effort to enable the desired architecture of international relations by relying on a latent force, whose possible use poses a permanent threat to enemy, without the need to resort to "the dirty work of the actual use of weapons".⁶³ The already mentioned distinction between secret and declarative doctrine comes here to the fore, which is characteristic not only for Klein, but also for other representatives of the second generation. Namely, Klein notices that nuclear deterrence strategy operates on two separate "tracks", the first one can be described as "proclaimed", and the second as "operational". The first track consists of the so-called "declarative politics", which implies a legitimizing discourse through which the US nuclear strategy is popularly explained by terms such as "defensiveness", "revenge" and "deterrence". It is a security narrative that shifts the US nuclear potential from the context of "action" to the context of "reaction". However, the real essence of nuclear deterrence strategy is hidden on the second track, in the domain of the so-called "action policies", which have long been out of the scope of public debates on national security. At such an operational level, the US nuclear potential has played a much more assertive role defined by the so-called counterforce strategy for nuclear weapons of enemy. Counterforce, which Beaufre views as tactics rather than strategy,⁶⁴ was developed at the very beginning of the Cold War, as a form of "protection" based on direct, offensive and targeted nuclear disabling of enemy. However, once a veil of secrecy has been removed from this strategy, and when national and world public have been informed of its existence, it has been crucial for the United States to discursively harmonize the newly presented, much more aggressive strategic concept with the proclaimed defensiveness of the US security policy. Only in this way the United States could continue with successful global power projection. In order to reconcile the two mentioned levels, declarative and operational, i.e. to harmonize "the idea of this preventive action and the complete political concept of the renunciation of aggression, this preventive action has been given a special name 'pre-emptive', emphasizing that it will be undertaken only if and when definite signs allow the inevitability of an enemy attack to be foreseen".⁶⁵

It can be concluded that the newly established reality, in which the US territory has become an accessible target for (nuclear) armed actions of the USSR almost overnight, has not pushed the US into foreign policy defensive, and has only led it to replace the former strategic *modus operandi* with strategic *modus vivendi*, without

⁶³ Ibid, p. 138.

⁶⁴ Andre Bofr, *Uvod u strategiju*, Vojnoizdavački zavod, Beograd, 1968, pp. 79-81.

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 81.

compromising its strategic-cultural “matrix”. During the entire Cold War, the US strategic culture remained assertive (more or less covertly) and hegemonic, and in its essence resulted in the aforementioned power projection. Therefore, Klein notes that the Cold War military strategies by Washington – containment, nuclear containment and expanded deterrence – were not only aimed at curbing the Soviet political and military expansion, but were driven by a much more ambitious global strategy – to export the US power projection.⁶⁶ By directing its power, both through military strategies and broader cultural patterns, the United States has accomplished its goal of becoming the pole that sets “security framework for post-war economic and political renewal and internationalization of liberal capital under multilateral conditions” in bipolar world.⁶⁷ In other words, relying on internal and foreign policy promotion of its power as defensive (with the rest of the Western Bloc under the umbrella of protection) and deterrent, the United States has largely succeeded in harmonizing the rules of the Cold War security and ideological competition with its interests.

Having in mind that the US military strategy is not only a part of national security policy oriented towards defence against external aggression, but that it is a part of a much broader strategy of “providing fields of social reproduction necessary for maintaining the US-centric and West-centric lifestyle”,⁶⁸ after the Second World War the United States relatively easily imposed itself as a hegemon in the circle of Western powers. Relying on its potential for nuclear deterrence and developed infrastructure for marketing the US capital in international market, the United States has imposed itself as a leader of “free world”, projecting its power through a broader strategic framework in which the elements of military strategy and international political economy are united within a legitimizing discourse of “defence against aggression” and “protection of the Western lifestyle”. When it comes to the rest of the world, above all, the so-called Third World and developing countries, the US power projection has gone a step further than its declarative defensive expression and acted more transparently in accordance with the true nature of its strategy. In order to prevent the spread of the Soviet influence in these countries, the United States has openly resorted to a wide range of offensive measures - from installing pro-American coup regimes and supporting secessionist groups, through direct military interventions, to open threats of nuclear weapons “to counter global threats that it has sponsored”.⁶⁹

In short, Klein views the US strategic culture as a legitimizing mechanism that, in order to impose global hegemony, justifies the use of military force abroad. Its

⁶⁶ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 140.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 141.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 140.

main instrument is power projection that has two faces, first - defensive and protective, based on an (internationally) attractive mix of military force and business⁷⁰ and second, which implies the offensive use of conventional military force and threat of nuclear weapons. We should bear in mind that Klein's "class of anatomy" of the US strategic culture is the result of the time in which it was created, that is, the insights gained during the last decade of the Cold War. However, his conclusions about the essence of the US strategic culture survived the end of the Bloc division and, to a great extent, have remained a valuable contribution to its understanding even in the conditions of the unipolarity that followed.

Discursive strategy of military elites

Klein's contribution to the development of strategic studies is not limited to the analysis of strategic culture and its "introspective" disclosure as an instrument of the hegemonic policy of great powers. For a holistic understanding of Klein's criticism, his analysis of discursive dimension of military strategy is also important, that is, his view of strategy as a form of power discourse.

Interested in the way military elites communicate with political and wider social environment, Klein in his book "The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or, Have You Read Any Good Defense Manuals Lately?"⁷¹ views the strategy *per se* as a discourse through which "a set of powers that governs both national and international politics" is established.⁷² Unlike strategic culture, which has its discursive dimension, and which Klein reduces to an instrument of legitimizing (latent) violent execution and maintenance of global hegemony, strategic discourse as a discursive strategy of military establishment aims to "discipline and tame the global political space",⁷³ that is, its adaptation to military world view. While strategic culture plays the role of "an advocate" of the use of force to impose a (Western, that is, liberal) cultural pattern on the rest of the world as "legitimate" one, strategic discourse serves for national and international promotion of the military pattern of organizational culture and the establishment of its dominance over political and economic organizational culture. Although Klein does not rely on organizational theory in his (re)conceptualization of strategic culture, as Elizabeth Kier or Barry R.

⁷⁰ Klein notices that the US power projection has been finally completed by the global network of military alliances and deployment of military bases around the world. However, he points out that the United States could afford these bases primarily due to the fact that "dollar, becoming an international currency of exchange, was 'as good as gold' and there was no need to convert it" *Ibid.*

⁷¹ Bradley S. Klein, "The Textual Strategies of the Military: Or, Have You Read Any Good Defence Manuals Lately?", in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), *International/Intertextual Relations*, Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989, pp. 97-112.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

Posen do, it is quite certain that the strategic preferences that “promote” strategic discourse can be largely identified with the organizational patterns that these authors talk about.⁷⁴ Alastair Johnston notices that for Klein and the second generation theorists, the implicit place is that different military elites share the same, or similar, strategic preferences,⁷⁵ that is, in the theoretical vocabulary of Kier and Posen, the same organizational patterns.⁷⁶ Hence, the strategic discourses created by these elites have the same purpose. A kind of militarizing, that is, realpolitik consensus is in force between them, resulting in “different national strategic discourses trying to create similar rigid visions of the threatening external world”.⁷⁷ In an effort to create “intragroup solidarity in order to support political hegemony, elites sow images of danger. These images tend to correlate with the kind of response to danger that emphasizes zero sum as a solution to conflict, force effectiveness and goal justice”.⁷⁸

Strategic discourse, which Klein also calls war discourse, is carried out in the form of a textual narrative, most often through strategic documents and military publications. Just as in the case of strategic culture, the real purpose of these texts is not to make a response to the security challenges arising from the objective reality that surrounds us. On the contrary, their task is to constitute reality in accordance with interests of military elites, that is, to “inscribe violence in political space”.⁷⁹ At this point, Klein builds on the post-structural interpretation of the relationship between language and reality, according to which language is not just a “passive” response to an external reference system, i.e. rules of “objective” reality, but, on the contrary, it is the creator of its own reference system,⁸⁰ thus contributing to reality shaping. Accordingly, he believes that, in a discursive context, the task of every military strategy is to provide proliferation of some visions of political life that “involve violent domestication of forces that have been presented as external, foreign and that should be tamed”.⁸¹

⁷⁴ Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine Between the Wars*, *ibid*, pp. 4-5; Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars”, *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995, pp. 69-71; Iver B. Neumann and Henrikki Heikka, *ibid*, pp. 14-15.

⁷⁵ Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, *ibid*, p. 18.

⁷⁶ This is an important place of disagreement between the second and third generation. See: Alastair I. Johnston, *ibid*. For example, Elizabeth Kier believes that not every army shares the same idea regarding the use of armed force and that “military culture does not refer to a general set of values and attitudes that all armies share”. Elizabeth Kier, “Culture and Military Doctrine: France between the Wars”, *gen.quote*, p.70.

⁷⁷ Alastair I. Johnston, *gen.quote*, p.18.

⁷⁸ *Ibid*.

⁷⁹ Bradley S. Klein, *gen.quote*, p. 99.

⁸⁰ See: Mišel Fuko, *Poredak diskursa*, Karpos, Loznica, 2019, p. 32.

⁸¹ Bradley S. Klein, *gen.quote*, p. 99.

Klein views contemporary strategic discourse as a kind of a discursive derivative of a realistic world view. It represents the summary of pivotal ideas that the realistic tradition has thought of over a long period, from Thucydides, through Saint Augustine, Machiavelli and Hobbes, all the way to Carl von Clausewitz and Max Weber. Similarly to strategic culture, strategic discourse starts from a rather state-centric understanding of politics and security, thus laying the foundation for shaping political environment according to a realistic value system. The state itself is “given” and “complete” and within limitations it imposes, Machiavelli’s ruler, that is, Weber’s statesman,⁸² has to boldly carry out its actions.⁸³ Such a state and government represent a reference framework by which citizens are directed towards the ideal of “a handsome warrior, virtuous armed citizens, nation under arms”.⁸⁴ In this case, as well, the mentioned realistic dichotomy on internal and external environment is in force, in which it firstly represents order, and then anarchy teeming with challenges and dangers. The implementation of this dichotomy makes it possible to (re)shape both internal and external political environment in accordance with the organizational culture of military elites. Therefore, strategic discourse, i.e. its textual instruments (strategic documents and defence manuals), aim to idealize the militarized image of state and government.

Classical realists presented a statesman as a sublime warrior, who, relying on the use of force policy, bravely fights a battle against the threats and uncertainties to which his country is exposed by anarchic international environment. This image of a statesman was presented to citizens as a desirable model of state power, but its purpose was equally external. The goal was not only to legitimize the use of force in front of national, but also to normalize it in front of international public. This was (and remains) possible only if there is not only internal, but also international consensus on two key aspects of the above-mentioned concept of state power - the first, which internally promotes state monism of the Hobbes’ state, superior to civil society, while externally advocates Westphalian order in which the state of Leviathan is the only legitimate actor in the field of international politics, and thus the only relevant factor of international security. The second aspect deals with the synergy of political and military skill represented by a civil leader, who has the *apparatus* of force at his disposal in the way that military leaders do, which gives the mentioned idealized image of a statesman, who is both a political visionary and military genius.⁸⁵ Klein points out that, during the Cold War, this aspect (statesman-ruler as the ideal of classical realism) was modified by the neorealist turn to the technocratic concept of state power. Instead of hero-statesman, the “avatars” of security policy came on the scene “in the form of crisis management,

⁸² See: Maks Veber, *Država: racionalna ustanova države i moderne političke partije i parlamenti*, Meditteran Publishing, Novi Sad, 2014, p. 50.

⁸³ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 101.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

intelligence meetings, centrally coordinated warfare from bunkers loaded with computers, obediently executed by military personnel with briefcases".⁸⁶ However, this depersonalization of state power, i.e. shifting the focus from statesmen to state administration, has not changed the essence of strategic discourse, which is the pursuit of hegemony of military organizational culture, that is, the establishment of "intellectual sphere within which 'the practice of organized peace abolition' becomes standard operating procedure".⁸⁷

Klein interprets the aspiration to establish the hegemony of strategic discourse as a strategy of reshaping external/anarchic political environment based on the world view characteristic of the holders of military organizational culture. For him, "inscribing violence" in (foreign) political space, through discursive, that is, textual "peace abolition" is an expression of the ancient aspiration of military strategists to bring tailor-made order in turbulent world politics. The task of such an order is not to eliminate threats to peace, but, on the contrary, to remove potential threats to successful warfare. It is the struggle to tame unpredictable *fortune*, as the main motive in the history of military skill. This unpredictability of fate for Klein is nothing else but "the world openness", which in its essence contradicts the military culture based on the rigid imperative of order and discipline. This contradiction is emphasized in the "difference between a war plan on paper and the actual course of battle",⁸⁸ which Clausewitz called "friction".⁸⁹ These are unforeseen circumstances (accidents, misinformation, faulty military equipment, exhaustion of units, illness, bad weather, etc.) that can lead to failure of a military campaign, and which therefore have to be kept to the minimum. The best way to accomplish this is to gain experience, that is, to develop certain patterns of behaviour,⁹⁰ which then become common practices that rather narrow the space for "friction".⁹¹ These patterns of behaviour result in specific military strategies and tactics, such as Philippe Petain's strategy of relying on heavy artillery in the 20th century,⁹² Giulio Douhet's strategy of air power supremacy or nuclear deterrence strategy. Each of these strategies was based on the assumption that destructive fire/nuclear power has the potential by inflicting fatal material and human losses on enemy, to eliminate the danger of "cracks" and reduce the uncertainty of warfare to a

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 102.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid, pp. 105-106.

⁸⁹ Klauzevic, *O ratu*, Vojno delo, Beograd, 1951, pp. 84-86.

⁹⁰ The backbone of this strategic thinking lies in Antoine-Henri Jomini's teaching on the immutability (essence) of strategy, whose principles remain the same throughout history whereas its methods change. Jomini, *Pregled ratne veštine*, Vojno delo, Beograd, 1952, p. 25; Bernard Brodie, "Strategy as a science", *World Politics*, Vol. 1, No. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1949, p. 468.

⁹¹ Klauzevic, gen.quote, p. 86.

⁹² Bernard Brodie, gen.quote, p. 470.

minimum. However, in order for such strategies to be accepted, both nationally and internationally, it was necessary to legitimize and normalize them in front of internal and world public opinion. This is where strategic discourse comes on the scene, whose task is to convince the public, both civil and military and national, and the one around the world, that, under the threat of destructive power, no matter whether it is gun, air or nuclear one, a man will inevitably turn to peace. It is through strategic discourse that military echelons around the world create a network of public apologies, composed of strategies, manuals, theories and analyses, which provide the continuity of military organizational culture, and thus the uninterrupted continuity of war, by successfully ending peace. Strategic discourse thus becomes “a part of a project of great strategy developed to tame and fill every [open] space with imperatives of power projection, and to do so in the name of security”.⁹³ In other words, hidden behind the narrative of the struggle for peace lies the very opposite of what has been proclaimed - the strategy of eternal war against the establishment of lasting peace.

Conclusion

By missing the most important academic debates in this field, the second generation theorists of strategic culture has been pushed to the very margin of strategic studies. The reason for its “ostracism” lies in the fact that despite “gradual acceptance of postpositivist theory in the field of international relations and security studies, the subdiscipline of strategic studies has remained largely isolated from these changes, as evidenced by the theoretical narrowness of strategic culture debate”.⁹⁴ Moreover, the critical position that the second generation authors use to approach this problem has certainly not contributed to gaining popularity in the field dominated by civil and military strategists, more committed to finding strategies for successful warfare and less to eliminating it. Therefore, Klein’s paper, inspired by post-structuralism and Neo-Marxist thought, was doomed to be ignored by the strategic *mainstream*, which, despite the aforementioned anthropological and cultural “jerks”, has remained deeply entrenched in a traditional interpretation of international relations and loyal to the main principles of realism.

Thus, in the first place, strategic studies have been damaged, which, after the end of the Cold War, as “outdated”, have faced rejection and ignorance by a great number of international security researchers.⁹⁵ Renouncing Klein and his research of

⁹³ Bradley S. Klein, gen.quote, p. 109.

⁹⁴ Edward Lock, gen.quote, p. 696.

⁹⁵ See: Vladimir Ajzenhamer, “Strateške studije – od vojnih nauka do studija bezbednosti”, in Vladimir N. Cvetković (ed.), *Nauke bezbednosti – vrste i oblici*, Univerzitet u Beogradu – Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2020, pp. 84-85.

strategic culture as instruments of the hegemonic interests of political and military elites, strategic studies have justified their identification with nuclear deterrence strategy, which many experts suspect that it has been overcome during the Cold War.⁹⁶ By removing the distinction between behaviour and culture, Gray and Jones dismissed as redundant the research of the instrumentalization of strategic culture, which, as Johnston notices, they have missed the chance to see its potential for “conscious manipulation in order to justify decision-makers’ competence, avoid criticism, curb dissidents and restrict access to the decision-making process”.⁹⁷ Contrary to Gray and Jones’ views, it was this potential that came to the fore during the first two decades of post-Cold War unipolarity. Liberal hegemony has brought new strategies based on the idea of humanitarian interventionism used by the United States and its NATO allies to remove the “friction” caused by the dissolution of the USSR and have reinscribed violence in world politics. Military interventions against Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq are *par excellence* confirmation of Klein’s thesis on the gap between declarative and real strategies. Unfortunately, the opportunity to study these “case studies” from the perspective of the second generation theories has not been used because Johnston followed by other authors such as Neumann, Heikka or Lock, have remained “bound” in the Gordian Knot of the relationship between behaviour and strategic culture. The truth is that the latter, from a constructivist point of view, have tried to “rehabilitate” some segments of Klein’s teaching, primarily those concerning the interpretation of strategy as a discourse. However, the main features of the debate on strategic culture today boil down to mere theorizing about what should and should not be included in this concept.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that Bradley Klein’s papers have always been filled with a healthy dose of humour and open cynicism, which is somewhat expected, having in mind that this author has directed his theory to sharp criticism of the political system of the world we live in. Therefore, it seems appropriate to end homage to his work with the quote by the famous Hollywood director Woody Allen: “We can say that the universe consists of a substance, and we will call this substance ‘atoms’, or we will call it ‘monads’. Democritus called it atoms. Leibniz called it monads. Fortunately, the two of them have never met, otherwise a very boring discussion would have developed”.⁹⁸ Unfortunately for strategic studies, Gray and Johnston did meet, and their “boring” discussion still resonates loudly in the field of strategic culture, overpowering every critical thought.

⁹⁶ Thus e.g. Henry Kissinger observes the following: “The nuclear age has turned strategy into deterrence, and deterrence into mere philosophizing. Since deterrence could only be verified on the basis of what did not happen, and as it is in principle impossible to prove why something did not happen, it becomes rather difficult to assess whether the current policy is optimal or only barely effective. Deterrence may not have been necessary since it is impossible to prove that an opponent has ever intended to attack”. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomatija*, Klub PLUS, Beograd, 2011, p. 548

⁹⁷ Alastair I. Johnston, gen.quote, p. 36.

⁹⁸ Vudi Alen, *Sad smo kvit*, Solaris, Novi Sad, 2008, p. 26.

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Стратешке студије у служби хегемоније: поглед на стратешку културу из угла друге генерације

Овај рад је посвећен другој генерацији тзв. културних стратега, чији је допринос развоју концепта стратешке културе и изучавању стратегије као форме дискурса у великој мери неправедно запостављен, нарочито када је реч о најистакнутијем представнику читаве генерације – Бредлију Клајну. Према мишљењу аутора овог рада, Клајнов неограмшијевски приступ стратешким студијама је недовољно искоришћен научни потенцијал, који може допринети бољем разумевању међународних односа и међународне безбедности. Стога аутор има за циљ да упозна читаоца са Клајновим критичким тумачењем стратешке културе, сагледане као дискурзивни инструмент хегемоније политичких и војних елита и да укаже на значај Клајнове анализе стратешког дискурса, који је намерно маргинализован од стране других теоретичара ове поддисциплине.

Кључне речи: *стратешке студије, стратешка култура, међународни односи, друга генерација, Бредли Клајн, хегемонија, стратешки дискурс, критичка теорија, Антонио Грамши*